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RIGHT-REMEDY EQUILIBRATION AND 
THE ASYMMETRIC ENTRENCHMENT OF 
LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 
MICHAEL COENEN* 
Abstract: Public-law litigation often gives rise to a basic but important asym-
metry: claimants wishing to obtain a particular form of redress for a particular le-
gal wrong must satisfy all the relevant procedural, substantive, and remedial pre-
requisites to the issuance of judicial relief. In contrast, governments wishing to 
avoid the issuance of that remedy need only demonstrate that a single such re-
quirement operates in their favor. This Article considers the extent to which this 
asymmetry influences the development of the law. Specifically, this Article hy-
pothesizes that, where the remediation of a right depends on a claimant’s satisfac-
tion of multiple, mutually necessary procedural, substantive, and remedial rules, 
it will often be easier for courts to achieve and maintain decisions that frustrate 
the vindication of that right (and thus move the law in an “entitlement-
weakening” direction) than to achieve and maintain judicial decisions that pro-
mote the vindication of that right (and thus move the law in an “entitlement-
strengthening” direction). “Entitlement-strengthening” initiatives, after all, can 
often be undone by a single, counteractive change to any one of the several rules 
on which a claimant’s vindication of the right depends. “Entitlement-weakening” 
initiatives, by contrast, will often be immune to such a simple counterattack. 
Consequently, an “asymmetric entrenchment of entitlements” is hardwired into 
the basic architecture of public-law doctrine, rendering “entitlement-
strengthening” decisions consistently more vulnerable to down-the-road re-
trenchment than their “entitlement-weakening” counterparts. 
INTRODUCTION 
Success in public-law litigation requires much more than a showing that 
the government violated the law. Before a court can evaluate the legality of the 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2020, Michael Coenen. All rights reserved. 
 * Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School. For helpful comments and suggestions, I 
am grateful to Anna Arkin-Gallagher, Anya Bernstein, Sam Bray, Josh Chafetz, Zachary Clopton, 
Dan Coenen, Seth Davis, Richard Fallon, Jeremy Golubcow-Teglasi, Leah Litman, Ashley Lott, Jim 
Pfander, Jon Romberg, Christopher Sherman, Scott Sullivan, Stephen Yelderman, and workshop par-
ticipants at the Notre Dame Law School Remedies Forum, the Duke University Law School Judicial 
Administration / Judicial Process Roundtable, and the Penn State Law School Faculty Colloquium. I 
am also grateful to Caroline Holliday and her colleagues at the Boston College Law Review for their 
immensely valuable editorial assistance. 
2020] Right-Remedy Equilibration and Asymmetric Entrenchment 131 
government’s conduct, it must first consider such matters as a party’s standing 
to sue,1 the ripeness of the controversy,2 the political question doctrine,3 the ex-
istence of a cause of action,4 abstention rules,5 and other potential limits on the 
Court’s power to resolve the case.6 In the event those prerequisites are met, a 
legal violation must then be identified. And even if a violation is identified, the 
court must consider its authority to issue the requested remedy. Immunity doc-
trines, for instance, might bar a plaintiff from recovering damages against a 
rights-infringing governmental official.7 “The balance of the equities” (or other 
limits on injunctive relief) might preclude a court from enjoining the operation 
of an unlawful administrative scheme.8 An exception to the exclusionary rule 
might require the admission of unlawfully acquired evidence.9 Non-retroactivity 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401–02 (2013) (holding that plaintiffs 
challenging Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act lacked Article III standing to 
bring their suit because, among other things, their “theory of future injury is too speculative” and they 
“cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm 
that is not certainly impending”). 
 2 See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S 497, 507 (1961) (“It is clear that the mere existence of a state 
penal statute would constitute insufficient grounds to support a federal court’s adjudication of its con-
stitutionality in proceedings brought against the State’s prosecuting officials if real threat of enforce-
ment is wanting.”). 
 3 See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (holding that partisan gerrymander-
ing claims present nonjusticiable political questions). 
 4 See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858 (2017) (“[I]f there are sound reasons to think 
Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy as part of the system for enforc-
ing the law and correcting a wrong, the courts must refrain from creating the remedy in order to re-
spect the role of Congress in determining the nature and extent of federal-court jurisdiction under 
Article III.”). 
 5 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971) (limiting the federal courts’ power to adju-
dicate federal-court suits seeking to disrupt ongoing criminal prosecutions in state court). 
 6 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009) (pleading standards); Kowalski v. Tesmer, 
543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004) (third-party standing); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 315 (1974) 
(mootness). 
 7 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that “government officials 
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as 
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasona-
ble person would have known”). 
 8 See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008) (“An injunction is a matter of equi-
table discretion; it does not follow from success on the merits as a matter of course.”); see also Trump 
v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017) (holding that lower courts should 
not have enjoined the enforcement of an earlier iteration of President Trump’s travel ban “against 
foreign nationals abroad who have no connection to the United States at all” and noting that “[t]he 
equities relied on by the lower courts do not balance the same way in that context”). 
 9 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 244 (2011) (“[E]xclusion of evidence does not 
automatically follow from the fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred. The remedy is sub-
ject to exceptions and applies only where its ‘purpose is effectively advanced.’” (internal citation 
omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S 340, 347 (1987))). 
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principles might defeat the granting of habeas relief.10 And so forth.11 To get 
the remedy it seeks, the claimant must navigate every obstacle standing be-
tween its initial demand for relief and a court’s granting of that relief. Winning 
claimants must run the table, satisfying every mutually necessary condition for 
obtaining the remedy they seek. Losing claimants, by contrast, can falter at any 
point for any number of different reasons. 
One implication of this arrangement has recently drawn the attention of 
public-law scholars. When a remedy’s issuance depends on the joint satisfac-
tion of multiple, formally separate doctrinal requirements, courts can adjust for 
unwanted developments within one area of doctrine by pursuing compensating 
reforms within another. This idea finds succinct expression in Professor Rich-
ard Fallon’s “Equilibration Thesis,” which posits that public-law rules govern-
ing justiciability, remedies, and substantive rights often interact with one an-
other in this responsive and offsetting manner. As Professor Fallon puts it: 
[C]ourts, and especially the Supreme Court, decide cases by seeking 
what they regard as an acceptable overall alignment of doctrines in-
volving justiciability, substantive rights, and available remedies. 
When facing an outcome or pattern of outcomes that it regards as 
practically intolerable or disturbingly sub-optimal, the Court will ad-
just or manipulate the applicable law. According to the Equilibration 
Thesis, however, it will frequently be the case that no unbending 
principle of law or logic dictates the doctrinal category within which 
an adjustment will occur. In other words, when the Court dislikes an 
outcome or pattern of outcomes, it will often be equally possible for 
the Justices to reformulate applicable justiciability doctrine, substan-
tive doctrine, or remedial doctrine.12 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (“Unless they fall within an exception to 
the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases 
which have become final before the new rules are announced.”). 
 11 See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 24 (1967) (holding that, absent the occur-
rence of structural error, appellate courts need not reverse convictions for constitutional error where 
the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
 12 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—and Their Connec-
tions to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 637 (2006) [hereinafter Fallon, The Linkage Between 
Justiciability and Remedies]; see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS 155–78 (2018) (developing and exploring different aspects and applications of the equilibra-
tion thesis); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 479, 480 (2011) [hereinafter Fallon, Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity] 
(“According to the Equilibration Thesis, substantive rights, causes of action to enforce rights, rules of 
pleading and proof, and immunity doctrines all are flexible and potentially adjustable components of a 
package of rights and enforcement mechanisms that should be viewed, and assessed for desirability, as 
a whole.”). In developing this idea, Fallon builds on a large body of existing scholarship highlighting 
functional interdependencies between rights-based and remedy-based law. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, 
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To take a simple example, courts might respond to a perceived over-expansion 
of rights-based guarantees (say, a strengthening of Fourth Amendment privacy 
protections) by pursuing reform within the substantive law itself (such as, for 
instance, by overruling the prior decision that expanded the Fourth Amend-
ment). But they also might pursue compensating adjustments within the law of 
remedies (such as by introducing a new exception to the exclusionary rule) or 
the law of justiciability (such as by ratcheting up standing requirements for 
plaintiffs seeking to assert the right in an offensive posture), while leaving the 
scope of the underlying “right” formally unchanged.13 Regardless of which 
path the court takes, a similar bottom-line result obtains: prior to the compen-
sating adjustment, more plaintiffs would have had access to meaningful judi-
cial redress against government searches and seizures. After the adjustment, 
fewer such plaintiffs will be able to obtain the redress they seek. And that re-
mains the case regardless of whether the adjustment involves substantive law, 
remedial law, justiciability law, or some other related body of rules. 
At first glance, this phenomenon would seem well suited to yield some 
measure of doctrinal stability across time. The equilibration process, that is, 
might sometimes function to moderate doctrinal excesses, operating as a nega-
tive feedback mechanism that prevents the law from veering too far in an over-
ly or “underly” rights-protective fashion. If a modification to Article III stand-
ing doctrine generates an unwanted flood of claimants asserting a particular 
type of substantive claim, a subsequent tightening of rights-defining rules can 
help to stem the tide. If a modification to remedy-based doctrine renders gov-
ernmental actors too unaccountable for constitutional wrongs, a subsequent 
expansion of rights-based protections can help to mitigate the prior decision’s 
unwanted effects. One adjustment to one component of a legal entitlement can 
                                                                                                                           
Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 99 (1999) (suggesting that sub-
stantive rights would be severely diminished in the absence of remedial rules that help to limit the 
practical costs of recognizing new rights in new cases); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and 
Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 884–85, 889–99 (1999) (highlighting ways in which 
“the threat of undesirable remedial consequences [can] motivat[e] courts to construct the right in such 
a way as to avoid those consequences”); see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment 
on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 650 (1985) (noting that “the Court’s view of the claim on 
the merits . . . will likely affect the standing determination as long as judges with strong feelings about 
substantive claims decide jurisdictional issues”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 
77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742–43 (1999) (“[Law students] can predict judicial decisions [related to 
standing] with much greater accuracy if they ignore doctrine and rely entirely on a simple description 
of the law of standing that is rooted in political science: judges provide access to the courts to individ-
uals who seek to further the political and ideological agendas of judges.”). 
 13 Or, conversely, as Fallon and others have suggested, a court might respond to concerns about 
the costs of the exclusionary rule by scaling back the scope of Fourth Amendment rights. See Fallon, 
The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies, supra note 12, at 646; see also Akhil Reed Amar, 
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 799 (1994); Guido Calabresi, The Exclu-
sionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 112 (2003). 
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easily be counteracted by another adjustment to another component. Outlier 
precedents thus become less “sticky” and their consequences less severe, as 
courts find ways to neutralize the effects of their prior decisions without direct-
ly overruling the decisions themselves.14 
But equilibration does not necessarily beget this sort of equilibrium, or so 
this Article will contend. The central difficulty in thinking otherwise lies in the 
assumption that the effectiveness of an equilibrating adjustment does not in 
any way depend on the direction in which the adjustment proceeds. But this 
will not always be true. Instead, as I will suggest, the conjoined and compart-
mentalized structure of legal entitlements—that is, their division into discrete 
sets of mutually necessary procedural, substantive, and remedial component 
parts—often will render “entitlement-weakening” initiatives easier to achieve 
and maintain than countervailing initiatives in the “entitlement-strengthening” 
direction.15 When a court sets out to weaken (or eliminate) a public-law enti-
tlement (i.e., to make it harder for claimants to obtain a particular remedy 
against a particular government actor for a particular legal wrong), the court 
need not often do much to achieve its desired change, and it subsequently can 
do a lot to fortify that change against countervailing efforts to equilibrate in the 
other direction.16 Where, by contrast, a court sets out to strengthen (or create) 
such an entitlement (i.e., to make it easier for claimants to obtain a particular 
remedy for a particular wrong) the court must often do a lot to achieve its de-
sired change, and it can only do so much to ensure that the change persists 
through time. Present-day efforts to strengthen legal entitlements will find 
themselves more vulnerable to down-the-road retrenchment than will corre-
sponding efforts to weaken those entitlements. 
Why would this be so? The answer to this question stems from the simple 
observation with which this Article began: to prevail on a demand for relief, a 
claimant must satisfy all the procedural, substantive, and remedial require-
ments that apply to a case, whereas to defeat that demand for relief, the gov-
ernment need only win on one of those grounds. Thus, judicial efforts to pro-
mote legal entitlements will succeed only if all the relevant prerequisites are 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Fallon, The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies, supra note 12, at 645–46. 
 15 This is a possibility that I believe Professor Fallon alludes to in his article but does not explore 
in further detail. See id. at 692 (noting that “when the courts are unsympathetic to claims or rights, the 
sharp separation of justiciability, substantive, and remedial doctrines does not necessarily conduce to 
the aggressive judicial enforcement of legal norms at all, but instead makes it possible for judges to 
fight rear-guard actions against judicial enforcement (after they have lost on the merits) by raising 
objections based on justiciability and remedial doctrines”); see also id. at 687 (noting that “courts that 
want to expand substantive rights typically also will want to effect needed adjustments in remedial 
and justiciability doctrine to make those rights effective”). But I am not aware of any existing scholar-
ship that attempts an in-depth examination of this idea. 
 16 See id. at 638. 
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made to operate in the claimant’s favor. Judicial efforts in the other direction, 
by contrast, need only create and maintain a single, government-friendly limit 
somewhere along the line. Judges who wish to frustrate the vindication of a 
substantive right will thus enjoy a power that their “entitlement-strengthening” 
counterparts will not—namely, the power to achieve their entitlement-specific 
goals by manipulating any one of the relevant procedural, substantive, and/or 
remedial rules that the claimant must navigate. An “entitlement-weakening” 
judge need only target a single link in the chain, whereas the “entitlement-
strengthening” judge must ensure that each and every link remains strong. The 
equilibration process will thus implicate what we might call the “asymmetric 
entrenchment of legal entitlements,” or the “entrenchment asymmetry” for 
short. 
Part I of this Article elaborates on this idea, but for now a more concrete 
example might help to illustrate the key point.17 Suppose that it is 1971, and 
you are a lower court judge unhappy about the Supreme Court’s recent deci-
sion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.18 
Specifically, you are uncomfortable with the idea of allowing plaintiffs to col-
lect damages against federal officials who have violated their Fourth Amend-
ment rights, and you are eager to do what you can to minimize the number of 
cases that produce this result. You adhere to vertical stare decisis, so you do 
not plan to try anything as radical as ignoring binding precedent. But where the 
case law gives you wiggle room, you take advantage of it, looking to under-
mine the entitlement in any way you can. You might sometimes manage to 
dismiss such an action on political question grounds. You might at other times 
rule for the government by finding no Fourth Amendment violation. You might 
at still other times manage to award qualified immunity to the defendant, or 
you might seize on the limiting language within Bivens itself to deny recogni-
tion of the cause of action in distinguishable cases. Some of these levers will 
not work for you in some cases; and others will not work for you in other cas-
es. But you need only find one lever per claim in order to sap the entitlement 
of its overall strength. 
Now imagine by contrast that you are a lower court judge today who feels 
that the Supreme Court has made it too difficult for plaintiffs to collect damag-
es against federal officials for violating their Fourth Amendment rights.19 Your 
concern is the opposite of that of the previously described judge: you think the 
entitlement first recognized in Bivens has become severely under-protective of 
the values it purports to serve. But to restore the entitlement’s vitality, you 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See discussion infra Section I.C. 
 18 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). 
 19 See, e.g., Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1843. 
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have a very tough row to hoe. You may be able to squeeze some cases into 
Bivens’s ever-narrowing domain,20 but even in these cases you will have addi-
tional hurdles to clear. You may need to navigate, for instance, the political 
question doctrine, Article III standing issues, government-friendly limits on 
Fourth Amendment rights, the state secrets privilege, rules of qualified and/or 
absolute immunity, and so forth.21 That is not to say that some (or even many) 
of the issues presented by those bodies of law cannot ever break in your favor. 
But, in contrast to the anti-Bivens judge from fifty years ago, you need all the 
stars to align in order to get the result you want. There is no easy way to vindi-
cate the entitlement in each case you decide, as you lack the wide-ranging 
menu of “entitlement-weakening” options that your counterpart was able to put 
to work.22 
This is just one example, to be sure, and it remains to be seen how gener-
ally the point applies. Indeed, as Part II of this Article shows, the entrenchment 
asymmetry does not always exist, and its presence and strength will vary ac-
cording to context. Most evidently, the extent of the asymmetry will depend on 
the number of prerequisites to relief that a claimant must satisfy: the higher the 
number of potential “veto points” for an “entitlement-weakening” judge to 
seize upon, the greater the comparative advantage that the “entitlement-
weakening” judge will enjoy.23 In addition, the extent of the asymmetry will 
depend on the strength and scope of stare decisis norms: the “cheaper” it be-
comes for an equilibrating court to reverse or narrow prior precedents, the less 
relevant it becomes that “entitlement-strengthening” judges must more often 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See Anya Bernstein, Catch-All Doctrinalism and Judicial Desire, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 
221, 221 (2013), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1108&context=penn_
law_review_online [https://perma.cc/93ZZ-V4RX] (“Courts confronting Bivens claims . . . like to note 
that the remedy is hanging on for dear life.”). 
 21 Cf. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1882–84 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “a Bivens action 
comes accompanied by many legal safeguards designed to prevent the courts from interfering with 
Executive and Legislative Branch activity reasonably believed to be necessary to protect national 
security”). 
 22 At first glance, this might seem like an unfair example, because it depends on the fact that the 
modern-day Court has rendered so many different areas of procedural and remedial law so uniquely 
hostile to the assertion of Bivens claims. In other words, one might contend that the true difference 
between our hypothetical anti-Bivens judge of 1971 and our pro-Bivens judge of 2019 is that the earli-
er judge was operating in a doctrinal landscape that was far less resistant to that judge’s Bivens-
reducing ends. Be that as it may, however, the important point is that asymmetry holds even on the 
assumption that the anti-Bivens judge and the pro-Bivens judge face procedural, substantive, and re-
medial doctrines that are equally adverse to their respective agendas. And the reason for that, as we 
have seen, is that the anti-Bivens judge will succeed as long as the judge finds a way around any one 
of those adverse doctrines, whereas the pro-Bivens judge will succeed only if the judge finds a way 
around all of them. 
 23 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
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grapple with on-point precedents that are adverse to their cause.24 And finally, 
the asymmetry may depend on the extent to which procedural and remedial rules 
apply in a genuinely “trans-substantive” fashion: courts may be less inclined to 
equilibrate against the expansion of a particular right when their actions will re-
verberate across other substantive regimes, and the less often that such equilibra-
tions occur, the less severe the asymmetry itself should become.25 In sum, where 
component requirements are numerous, stare decisis norms strong, and the oper-
ative rules trans-substantive, “entitlement-weakening” changes to the law 
should prove substantially more resistant to counteractive equilibration than 
their “entitlement-strengthening” counterparts. Where component requirements 
are few, stare decisis norms weak, and the operative rules less generalized, the 
asymmetry should be correspondingly less stark.26 
Having identified the conditions on which the strength of the asymmetry 
depends, this Article next considers the means by which it might be overcome. 
Specifically, Part III highlights various strategies that “entitlement-strengthen-
ing” judges might employ in an effort to resist or work around the special 
headwinds they face. For example, “entitlement-strengthening” judges might 
attempt to increase the remedial “payoff” for claimants who manage to secure 
the entitlement in question: by “scaling remedies upwards,” “entitlement-
strengthening” judges might sometimes manage to mitigate or neutralize the 
effects of earlier encroachments on the entitlement itself.27 Another strategy 
might involve the development of and reliance on definitional interdependen-
cies between an entitlement’s respective procedural, substantive, and remedial 
components. Where, for instance, the application of a remedial rule depends on 
the application of a substantive rule (consider, for instance, the rule that quali-
fied immunity is unavailable where an officer violates “clearly established” 
law), targeted, “entitlement-strengthening” reforms to one area of doctrine 
(e.g., making the substantive law more clear) may yield automatic “entitle-
ment-strengthening” consequences within other areas of doctrine as well (e.g., 
making qualified immunity defenses easier to defeat).28 And yet another strate-
gy might involve the creation and enforcement of multiple “substitute entitle-
ments”—formally separate packages of rights and remedies that end up pro-
moting overlapping (if not wholly duplicative) sets of legal interests and val-
ues; by propping up multiple, substitute entitlements in this way, the propo-
nents of those interests and values can benefit from a counteractive asymmetry 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 25 See discussion infra Section II.C. 
 26 See discussion infra Section II.C. 
 27 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 28 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
138 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:129 
that works to the benefit of the interests and values themselves.29 All of these 
strategies, as we will see, carry some but ultimately limited promise, suggest-
ing that the entrenchment asymmetry cannot always be easily overcome. 
That sets the stage for a final question: to the extent that the entrenchment 
asymmetry is real, what practical implications follow from its existence? Part 
IV highlights and considers a few possibilities. First, from a descriptive per-
spective, I consider how full recognition of the asymmetry might inform both 
our understanding of past doctrinal developments and our predictions about 
future such developments as well.30 Second, I consider from a strategic per-
spective the means by which courts and other legal actors might utilize the 
asymmetry to their own strategic advantage.31 And finally, from a normative 
perspective, I consider whether the asymmetry is a good, bad, or neutral phe-
nomenon.32 Although the takeaways on each point are tentative, the discussion 
should, I hope, help to reveal that the entrenchment asymmetry is a phenome-
non that judges, practitioners, and legal scholars all have reason to consider 
and care about. 
Having said those things, I should hasten to add an important caveat. 
Nothing in the ensuing discussion is intended to suggest that the asymmetric 
entrenchment of legal entitlements operates as the only factor of relevance to 
those entitlements’ overall robustness and durability. To the contrary, the doc-
trinal structures giving rise to the asymmetry will often find their influence 
overcome (if not overwhelmed) by other, more powerful forces that push in an 
“entitlement-strengthening” direction. Politics and judicial ideology, for in-
stance, will always matter a great deal; coteries of judges (and especially jus-
tices) who are committed to the strengthening of a particular entitlement can 
and often do find ways to undo their predecessors’ “entitlement-weakening” 
efforts, even where doing so requires independently costly changes to multiple 
areas of the law. Wealth, power, and influence among litigants matters as well. 
The enhanced entrenchment of “entitlement-weakening” rules may not pose 
much of an impediment to the expansion of entitlements that benefit interest 
groups with the resources, connections, and know-how to litigate on those enti-
tlements’ behalf. Nor of course should we forget about the actual content of the 
law: where strong “internal” arguments from text, history, structure, and prec-
edent provide clear legal support for an “entitlement-strengthening” effort, 
those sources themselves may suffice to preserve and protect that effort against 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See discussion infra Section III.C. 
 30 See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 31 See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
 32 See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
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subsequent undoing.33 In short, positing the existence of the entrenchment 
asymmetry is by no means equivalent to predicting that all legal entitlements are 
destined to perish in the long run. The asymmetry represents one among many 
different forces, factors, and phenomena that bring themselves to bear on the 
development of legal doctrine. The goal of this Article is therefore not to posit a 
myopic model of legal change; rather, it is to enrich our understanding of one 
small part of the complex process by which the law evolves through time. 
I. THE BASIC IDEA 
A. Definitional Preliminaries 
Let us begin with the idea of a legal entitlement. For purposes of this Ar-
ticle, a “legal entitlement” is defined as a particular type of remedy made 
available in response to a particular violation of a substantive right.34 The en-
titlement, in other words, consists of more than just a right or remedy in isola-
tion; rather, the entitlement consists of a specific rights-based protection joined 
together with a specific remedial enforcement mechanism. Under this defini-
tion, for instance, it would be inaccurate to say that the “exclusion of evi-
dence” or “the Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches” qualifies 
                                                                                                                           
 33 As Michael Klarman has suggested, legal decision making can be thought of as involving two 
axes of influence. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 5 (2004). First, there is a “legal axis, which con-
sists of sources such as text, original understanding, and precedent” and which “exists along a contin-
uum that ranges from determinacy to indeterminacy.” Id. (emphasis added). And second, there is a 
“political axis, which consists of factors such as the personal values of judges, the broader social and 
political context of the times, and external political pressure” and which “exists along a continuum 
that ranges from very strong preferences to relatively weak ones.” Id. (emphasis added). The claims of 
this Article are consistent with this model. Some cases will involve legal sources of sufficient deter-
minacy to dictate doctrinal results that run counter to judges’ own personal preferences, and where 
this is so, both “entitlement-weakening” and “entitlement-strengthening” efforts will be equally con-
strained by whatever the law requires. Other cases will involve “political preferences” that are strong 
enough to overcome any and all legal barriers that might stand in their way; where that is so, both 
“entitlement-weakening” and “entitlement-strengthening” efforts will manage to blow through what-
ever legal barriers purport to foreclose the desired change. But there will be a further set of cases in 
which the legal barriers and external pressures are sufficiently comparable in force as to make the 
asymmetry matter. That is, the external pressures might suffice to overcome one set of legal barriers, 
posed by one particular component requirement, but not all of the legal barriers posed by all of the 
component requirements. Under those circumstances, an “entitlement-strengthening” change to the 
law will tend to require a stronger set of external forces than will an “entitlement-weakening” change 
to that law. 
 34 In case it is not already clear, I am here and throughout this Article using the word “entitle-
ment” as something of a term of art to capture a particular type of thing for which I can find no better 
descriptor. I do not mean to reference other concepts and phenomena that the term is sometimes used 
to describe. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972) (defining property rights for 
procedural due process purposes as interests for which circumstances create a “legitimate claim of 
entitlement” on the part of the rights-holder). 
140 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:129 
as a legal entitlement. But one could identify a legal entitlement in, say, a crim-
inal defendant’s “power to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches.” Similarly, a legal enti-
tlement would amount to more than just, say, “the right against cruel and unu-
sual punishment” or the “awarding of monetary damages to the victims of past 
legal wrongs.” Rather, the relevant entitlement would be something like: “a 
plaintiff’s power to recover damages against a state official who subjects that 
person to cruel and unusual punishment.” An entitlement, in short, arises from 
a distinctive combination of substantive and remedial rules. 
Next, the “availability” of a given entitlement is defined as the extent to 
which claimants are able to obtain it. Unavailable entitlements might be things 
like post-conviction relief from a conviction based on evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment,35 damages relief against the judge who 
imposed a gag order in violation of one’s free speech rights,36 or various other 
right-remedy combinations that existing doctrines purport to withhold. Low-
availability entitlements might be things like: post-conviction relief for “inef-
fective assistance of counsel,”37 the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant 
to the execution of an invalid warrant,38 or various other right-remedy combi-
nations that existing case law permits but makes quite difficult for claimants to 
secure. And higher-availability entitlements might be things like: a declaratory 
judgment that a prior restraint on speech violates the Free Speech Clause,39 the 
reversal of a conviction obtained in violation of the Batson v. Kentucky rule,40 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (“[W]here the State has provided an opportunity 
for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal 
habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was 
introduced at his trial.”). 
 36 See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (holding that judges are absolutely im-
mune under Section 1983 from damages awards for unlawful conduct undertaken pursuant to their 
official judicial duties). 
 37 Compare, e.g., Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (holding, with respect to 
trials in federal court, that “an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be brought in a collateral 
proceeding under § 2255, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal”), 
with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (creating a high bar to the vindication of an inef-
fective assistance claim on its merits). 
 38 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009) (finding that “the deterrent 
effect of suppression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice system” for evidence to 
be suppressed and that “when police mistakes are the result of negligence . . . rather than systemic 
error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not ‘pay its 
way’” (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984))). 
 39 See, e.g., Robinson v. Hunt Cty., 921 F.3d 440, 450 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that the district 
court erred in dismissing a request for declaratory relief against an allegedly unconstitutional prior 
restraint and noting that “a court may grant declaratory relief even though it chooses not to issue an 
injunction or mandamus” (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 499 (1969))). 
 40 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88–89 (1986) (prohibiting the use of race-based peremp-
tory challenges); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 
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or other right-remedy combinations less stringently reined in by existing doc-
trinal rules. We might even imagine expressing each entitlement’s availability 
in terms of a numerical probability rate intended to capture the likelihood of a 
given claimant’s obtaining it—e.g., with low-availability entitlements posting 
values closer to the 0% threshold and high-availability entitlements posting 
values substantially higher than that. Obviously, any effort to measure and 
quantify “availability rates” in this way would encounter a number of practical 
and conceptual difficulties. But even if objective measurement remains infea-
sible, one can still apply rough-cut, qualitative judgments about whether some 
entitlements are more or less available to the claimants who seek them, and 
one can still plausibly predict whether a given legal change is likely to increase 
or decrease an entitlement’s availability.41 
More specifically, an entitlement’s availability depends on the doctrinal 
rules associated with its component requirements. By “component require-
ment” I mean a discretely identifiable legal standard that a claimant must satis-
fy in order to obtain the entitlement. If, say, the relevant entitlement is “a crim-
inal defendant’s power to suppress evidence obtained from an unreasonable 
search,” its component requirements would include: (a) Fourth Amendment 
standing requirements governing the defendant’s power to challenge the 
search;42 (b) substantive Fourth Amendment requirements governing the valid-
ity of the search itself;43 and (c) the remedial rules relevant to determining 
whether exclusion is a proper remedy for a demonstrably unlawful search.44 
Note in particular that component requirements, as we have defined them, 
                                                                                                                           
MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2018 (1998) (noting that federal courts have tended to treat Batson errors as 
“structural defects” warranting automatic reversal on appeal). 
 41 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–83 (1964). 
 42 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 129–30, 148 (1978) (noting that “petitioners lacked 
standing to object to the allegedly unlawful search and seizure” because “[t]hey asserted neither a 
property nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interest in the property seized”). 
 43 If, for instance, the search involved a Terry stop, then the relevant “substantive” component of 
the entitlement would derive from the particular Fourth Amendment-based limits on government 
conduct developed in Terry v. Ohio and its successor cases. 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968). 
 44 See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 897 (“The question whether the exclusionary sanction is appropri-
ately imposed in a particular case as a judicially created remedy to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights through its deterrent effect, must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing 
the use in the prosecution’s case in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence.”). There is ad-
mittedly some slipperiness in this definition. Reasonable minds might disagree as to whether, for 
instance, a collection of thematically related rules is better thought of as representing a single “com-
ponent” requirement or a series of smaller-scale component requirements, just as they might disagree 
as to whether some other rule should qualify as a component of the entitlement in question or as 
something altogether distinct from the entitlement itself. But these sorts of semantic arguments will 
often not matter much, at least with respect to the fundamental point of establishing the existence of 
the asymmetric entrenchment of entitlements. The key point to recognize is simply that most, if not 
all, legal entitlements depend on the satisfaction of multiple component requirements—however those 
requirements might be defined. 
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must exist in a conjunctive relationship to one another. If a claimant needs to 
show both “A” and “B or C” in order to obtain an entitlement, then the enti-
tlement’s two respective components would be the requirement to show A and 
the requirement to show “B or C”; we would not say that B and C each consti-
tute separate, independent components of the entitlement in question.45 Notice 
further that an entitlement’s overall availability will ultimately depend on the 
“pass rates” of its constituent components—specifically, if we could somehow 
quantify each component’s “pass rate,” and if we could further demonstrate 
that each component operated independently of the others,46 then the entitle-
ment’s overall availability rate would be equivalent to the product of its re-
spective components’ pass rates. 
Finally, “doctrinal equilibration” occurs when a court alters or adjusts the 
law associated with one of an entitlement’s component requirements so as to 
neutralize, compensate for, or offset the entitlement-altering effects of some 
earlier adjustment to another component requirement. Thus, if a prior change 
to a remedy-based rule renders a given entitlement less “available” for claim-
ants to secure, a court might equilibrate against that change by rendering the 
substantive law associated with that entitlement more claimant-friendly—
enough so, at least, to undo the “entitlement-weakening” effects of the earlier 
doctrinal adjustment. Similarly, if a prior change to justiciability-based law 
(e.g., Article III standing doctrine) renders a given entitlement easier for 
claimants to secure, a court might equilibrate against that change by ratcheting 
up the restrictions on its remedial component (e.g., equitable principles gov-
erning injunctive relief). Such equilibrating efforts, to be sure, will not fully 
restore the entitlement back to its original reform—its respective components 
will themselves remain altered from their earlier positions. But the equilibra-
tion process will at least have succeeded at restoring the overall “availability” 
of the entitlement back to its original level, bringing one component’s pass rate 
up as another component’s pass rate has gone down.47 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Note also that, where procedural and substantive rules apply in a genuinely trans-substantive 
fashion, a given component requirement can belong to more than one legal entitlement. The rules of 
Article III standing, for instance, would function as a component requirement for the entitlement gov-
erning a plaintiff’s power to collect damages against a state official for a violation of the First 
Amendment, the entitlement governing a plaintiff’s power to secure an injunction against an ongoing 
violation of the Second Amendment, and so forth. And the same is true of substantive rights that apply 
without distinction against different procedural and remedial contexts. The entitlement governing a 
plaintiff’s power to secure injunctive relief against a feared Eighth Amendment violation may in that 
way depend on the same “substantive” component as the entitlement governing a plaintiff’s power to 
secure damages relief for a past Eighth Amendment violation. For further discussion of the relation-
ship between the entrenchment asymmetry and general applicability, see infra Section I.D. 
 46 Note that this assumption will not always be true. See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
 47 See Levinson, supra note 12, at 858, 874. 
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Doctrinal equilibration is in this sense quite different from the outright re-
versal or overruling of an earlier, disfavored decision. A court does not “equili-
brate” against a claimant-friendly adjustment to Article III standing doctrine by 
repudiating the prior decision that was responsible for the adjustment. Rather, 
doctrinal equilibration proceeds by means of a more circuitous course; indeed, 
the phenomenon owes its significance to the fact that, unlike the direct overrul-
ing of a prior precedent, an equilibration-based response to a prior decision is 
not formally subject to stare decisis-based constraints. Doctrinal equilibration, 
in other words, sometimes furnishes courts with a means of functionally undo-
ing a prior, disfavored decision without formally purporting to overrule it. Ra-
ther than disavow its earlier expansion of a now-disfavored substantive right, 
the court can instead simply pull back on the remedy. Rather than disavow its 
earlier contraction of a now-favored remedy, the court can instead simply ex-
pand the scope of the right. Either way, equilibration enables the court to push 
back against the effects of a prior decision while leaving that decision itself 
formally intact.48 
B. Equilibration in Action—A Few Examples 
All of this is rather abstract, so let us consider a few examples. The pri-
mary purpose of these examples is to help flesh out the concepts introduced in 
Section A of this Part. But the examples will also serve the secondary purpose 
of foreshadowing the thesis that this Article advances—namely, that the equili-
bration process is inherently better-suited to serve “entitlement-weakening” 
rather than “entitlement-strengthening” goals.49 
1. Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II) 
A relatively straightforward example of equilibration in action involves 
the Court’s early decisions concerning school desegregation.50 In Brown I, the 
Supreme Court declared that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited race-based 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See id. at 891–92. I should emphasize that, although equilibration might often occur as the 
result of a conscious judicial choice, it might also arise as the product of subconsciously driven moti-
vated reasoning. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some 
Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (2011) (highlighting the possibility that 
judges might sometimes be “unwittingly impelled to form perceptions of fact, interpretations of doc-
trines, and evaluations of legal arguments congenial to their own worldviews”). It is, in my view, 
quite possible for a court to “equilibrate” against a disfavored change to the law even where the 
court’s own members honestly understand themselves to be applying the law in a neutral and impartial 
fashion. 
 49 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 50 See FALLON, supra note 12, at 156 (characterizing Brown II as “[t]he most famous, and proba-
bly most notorious, example” of the equilibration process). 
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segregation in public schools.51 One year later, the Court in Brown II confront-
ed the remedial question of how lower courts should ensure compliance with 
Brown I.52 In doing so, the Court struck a decidedly less claimant-friendly 
tone. School districts in violation of Brown I’s substantive holding, the Court 
explained, were not obligated to bring themselves into compliance right 
away.53 Instead, the Court held, “equitable principles” militated in favor of a 
remedial approach that required “practical flexibility” and a “facility for ad-
justing and reconciling public and private needs.”54 Thus, rather than insisting 
on immediate compliance with Brown I or offering specific and concrete dead-
lines for district courts to impose, the Court instructed its subordinates to “en-
ter such orders and decrees . . . as are necessary and proper to admit to public 
schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the par-
ties to these cases.”55 
That remedial formulation, as many commentators have noted, signifi-
cantly undercut the right that Brown I purported to guarantee.56 Segregationists 
could and would seize on the decision’s “loose phraseology” to delay, frustrate, 
and otherwise resist integration in the years following Brown II.57 Even though 
Brown I continued to declare a robust and absolute prohibition on de jure seg-
regation in public schools, the decision’s constitutional proclamation would 
carry little practical significance across the countless school districts where, 
thanks to Brown II, desegregation efforts remained deliberately and indefinite-
ly delayed. The right against segregated public schooling would thus end up 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (extending Brown I’s holding to apply to federally operated public schools 
in the District of Columbia). 
 52 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 53 Id. at 300–01. 
 54 Id. at 300; cf. also Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the 
Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 614 (2002) (noting that, during their deliberations over 
Brown, “the Justices . . . spoke of the possibility of public school closings and violence should they 
rule to outlaw segregation”). 
 55 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301. 
 56 See, e.g., CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST 
HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, at xiii (2004) (“[T]he Court removed much of 
the force of its decision [in Brown I] by allowing proponents of segregation to end it not immediately 
but with ‘all deliberate speed.’”); Jim Chen, With All Deliberate Speed: Brown II and Desegrega-
tion’s Children, 24 LAW & INEQ. 1, 3 (2006) (“The infamous ‘all deliberate speed’ formula and the 
South’s massive resistance to desegregation arguably dissipated much of Brown I’s promise.”). 
 57 KLARMAN, supra note 33, at 318 (noting that the decision “adopted loose phraseology that 
could neither constrain evasion nor bolster compliance,” and characterizing the decision as a “solid 
victory for white southerners”). 
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losing much of its vitality on account of the remedial rule that would come to 
operate alongside it.58 
Put in the parlance of this Article, the remedial holding of Brown II can be 
understood as equilibrating against the substantive holding of Brown I. Brown I 
had, on its face, appeared to create a robust legal entitlement that would ensure 
meaningful injunctive relief to children attending school within segregated 
systems. Brown II, however, significantly reduced the “availability” of that 
entitlement by rendering its “remedial” component—that is, the rules govern-
ing the issuance of injunctive relief—hostile to plaintiffs’ demand for quick 
and meaningful compliance under Brown I. Without overruling Brown I itself, 
the Court nonetheless managed to take much of the wind out of its sails; the 
“substantive component” of the Brown entitlement remained unaltered, but its 
remedial component—and thus the entitlement as a whole—ended up assum-
ing a decidedly less claimant-friendly shape.59 
2. Paul v. Davis 
A second example of equilibration in action involves the case law govern-
ing procedural due process rights for the victims of reputational harm. Paul v. 
Davis arose from a civil action brought by an individual (Davis) who alleged 
that the Louisville Police Department had incorrectly included his name and 
image on a publicly distributed list of “subjects known to be active” in “shop-
lifting activity.”60 Davis alleged a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause, claiming that the commissioner had unconstitutionally 
denied him notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to acting in a manner 
that damaged his reputation. Relying on the cause of action conferred by 42 
U.S.C. § 1983,61 Davis sought to recover damages from the police commis-
sioner for the harms he suffered on account of his conduct.62 
The Court rejected Davis’s claim, concluding that Davis lacked a “liberty 
interest” in his reputation, thus excluding his complaint from the Due Process 
                                                                                                                           
 58 The Court would eventually come to repudiate the “all deliberate speed” standard, thus alleviat-
ing some of the “entitlement-weakening” effects of its earlier decision in Brown II. See Griffin v. Cty. 
Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964) (“The time for mere ‘deliberate speed’ 
speed has run out . . . .”). But it would subsequently end up saddling Brown I with other remedial 
holdings that frustrated lower courts’ efforts to remediate school desegregation around the country. 
See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (severely limiting lower courts’ power to 
fashion interdistrict remedies for violations of Brown I); see also Richard Thompson Ford, Brown’s 
Ghost, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1312 (2004) (characterizing Milliken as “the case that effectively 
repudiated Brown’s . . . mandate”). 
 59 See Levinson, supra note 12, at 877. 
 60 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 695–96 (1976). 
 61 Id. at 696–97. 
 62 Brief for Respondent at 20, Paul, 424 U.S. 693 (No. 74-891), 1975 WL 173823. 
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Clause’s domain.63 But the Court’s decision, as many commentators have not-
ed, seemed largely to be driven by concerns regarding the nature of the remedy 
sought.64 Some fifteen years earlier, in Monroe v. Pape, the Court held that 
plaintiffs seeking damages under Section 1983 were not required to first seek 
state law remedies for their harm.65 Thus, under Monroe, a plaintiff like Davis 
could seek constitutional damages relief in federal court as an alternative to the 
state law defamation action that pre-Monroe case law would have required as a 
precondition to the suit.66 And in Paul that possibility ultimately proved too 
much for the Court to take. Specifically, the Court feared that vindicating Da-
vis’s due process claim would have the effect of converting the Fourteenth 
Amendment into a “font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever sys-
tems may already be administered by the States.”67 Fear about the remedial 
implications of finding a constitutional violation thus motivated the Court to 
conclude that no such violation occurred; the Section 1983 “tail” was “wag-
ging the constitutional dog.”68 
What is most significant about Paul for our purposes is simply that, as in 
Brown II,69 a single change to a single component requirement carried with it 
an immediate and dramatic effect on the overall availability of the entitlement 
that Davis had sought to obtain.70 Davis wished to secure damages relief for an 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Paul, 424 U.S. at 712. 
 64 See, e.g., Fallon, Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, supra note 12, at 488; 
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 277 (2000); Levinson, 
supra note 12, at 893. 
 65 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). 
 66 See id. (“The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be 
first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”); see also Barbara E. Armacost, Race and 
Reputation: The Real Legacy of Paul v. Davis, 85 VA. L. REV. 569, 572 (1999) (noting that Monroe 
“essentially ‘invented’ the Section 1983 cause of action as we know it,” by making clear that “Section 
1983 provides a federal remedy in federal court regardless of whether the conduct at issue violated 
state as well as federal law”). 
 67 Paul, 424 U.S. at 701. 
 68 Jeffries, supra note 64, at 277; see also Levinson, supra note 12, at 893 (citing Paul as an ex-
ample of “remedial deterrence,” with the Court acting out of fears of “the wholesale federalization of 
tort claims against state and local government officials and the corresponding prospect of massive 
damages liability”). 
 69 Indeed, Paul in this respect presents something of a mirror image of Brown II. Whereas Brown 
II involved a manipulation of remedial law that would largely offset the effects of a prior, rights-
expanding substantive decision, Paul involved a manipulation of rights-based law that would largely 
offset the effects of a prior, remedy-expanding decision. Either way, however, both cases shared the 
important attribute of “shutting down” access to a previously available legal entitlement by targeting 
one and only one of its multiple component parts. 
 70 Notably, Paul was not the only case the Supreme Court decided in which it “further narrowed 
the class of constitutional damages claims that may be brought under the Due Process Clause.” See 
Armacost, supra note 66, at 570 (citing as additional examples DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), Hudson v. Palmer, 468 
U.S. 517 (1984), and Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), among others). These cases, too, might 
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alleged violation of due process in connection with reputation-damaging gov-
ernmental action. The remedial component of that entitlement—i.e., the rules 
governing the availability of a Section 1983 action for relief—remained for-
mally unaltered by the Court’s decision in his case.71 Nevertheless, for Davis 
and future claimants like him, Monroe’s expansive reading of Section 1983 
meant very little in light of the non-viability of the due process claim they 
would have liked to have asserted. That future victims of reputation-damaging 
governmental action would encounter reduced remedial barriers to seeking dam-
ages under Section 1983 was no longer of any significance because the Court’s 
substantive holding in Paul ensured that they would only infrequently prevail on 
the merits. The Court had thus managed to equilibrate against the “entitlement-
strengthening” effects of Monroe’s expansive remedial decision by adopting an 
“entitlement-weakening” construction of the Due Process Clause itself. 
3. Los Angeles v. Lyons 
Doctrinal equilibration can also occur within justiciability doctrine. In Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, the plaintiff, Adolphus Lyons, sought an injunction against 
the use of chokeholds by the city’s police officers.72 The lower courts ruled in 
Lyons’s favor, finding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of substan-
tive due process likely prohibited an officer from administering chokeholds 
under circumstances not threatening death or serious bodily injury and thus 
preliminarily enjoining all city officials from administering such chokeholds 
going forward.73 But the Supreme Court reversed, and it did so on the ground 
that Lyons lacked Article III standing to press for the injunctive relief he 
sought.74 
The ostensible reason for this conclusion had to do with the absence of 
any indication that Lyons himself was “likely to suffer future injury from the 
use of the chokeholds by police officers.”75 This was so, the Court made clear, 
even though Lyons had indeed suffered such an injury in the past, as the past 
                                                                                                                           
be understood as efforts to “equilibrate against” the remedy-expanding implications of Monroe by 
rendering different types of due process claims more difficult for claimants to prevail on. 
 71 It is perhaps worth noting that the Court’s decision in Paul v. Davis largely preceded a subse-
quent line of cases that would bolster official immunity doctrines and thus also render the remedial 
component of the entitlement significantly more difficult for subsequent claimants to satisfy. See, e.g., 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817–18 (holding that “bare allegations of malice” cannot suffice to defeat an 
assertion of qualified immunity and that “government officials performing discretionary functions 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”). 
 72 Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97 (1983). 
 73 See Lyons v. Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 417, 418 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 74 See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103. 
 75 Id. at 105. 
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injury “d[id] nothing to establish a real and immediate threat that he would 
again be stopped for a traffic violation, or for any . . . offense, by an officer or 
officers who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any 
provocation or resistance on his part.”76 But, as Richard Fallon has suggested, 
the decision seemed to derive from more than abstract musings about Article 
III’s “case or controversy” requirement. Specifically, the Court was responding 
to what it perceived as troubling remedial consequences that would follow 
from allowing Lyons and other plaintiffs like him to obtain city-wide injunc-
tions against unconstitutional forms of policing.77 Unlike in Brown I and Paul, 
no single decision about injunctive relief was the source of the relevant con-
cern. Rather, it was the Court’s general sense that equitable principles in their 
current form were leading lower courts to issue especially intrusive and costly 
“structural” injunctions against vital governmental operations.78 And thus, by 
ratcheting up the Article III standards that any future applicant for a similar 
injunction would have to satisfy, the Court could correspondingly ratchet down 
the likelihood that any such injunction would subsequently issue. 
Lyons is in one sense an odd case because the Court—having denied 
standing to Lyons—nevertheless went on to explain why “traditional equitable 
principles” would in any event have barred the district court from issuing the 
injunction.79 That latter portion of the Court’s decision, as Justice Marshall’s 
dissenting opinion pointed out, was superfluous in light of the Court’s earlier 
denial of standing: even if equitable principles had favored the issuance of the 
injunction in Lyons, the plaintiff’s lack of standing to seek it would have pro-
hibited the district court from issuing it.80 Even so, Lyons’s decision on stand-
ing still served to undercut further the more claimant-friendly equitable princi-
ples on which the lower court opinion was based. By making it all but impos-
sible for Lyons and subsequent plaintiffs to demonstrate Article III standing, 
the Court necessarily made it all but impossible for them to secure their desired 
forms of injunctive relief.81 Even where substantive and remedial principles 
might otherwise cut in favor of efforts to secure prospective vindication of 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id. 
 77 Fallon, The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies, supra note 12, at 650 (“It is hard not 
to believe that . . . concerns about the peculiar intrusiveness of injunctive remedies influenced the 
Court’s disparate rulings with respect to standing.”). 
 78 Cf. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1292 (1976) (noting that “[o]ne of the most striking procedural developments of this century is the 
increasing importance of equitable relief” and that “surely, the old sense of equitable remedies as 
‘extraordinary’ has faded”); see Paul, 424 U.S. at 693; Brown I, 387 U.S. at 483. 
 79 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111–13. 
 80 Id. at 134–35 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 81 See Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still Mov-
ing!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 168 (2003) (noting that Lyons “has ensured that victims of police bru-
tality will rarely, if ever, be allowed to enjoin injurious police practices”). 
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rights, the high hurdle of having to allege a non-speculative future injury was 
itself sufficient to close off access to the entitlement. 
4. Equilibration Through Application (or Death by a Thousand Cuts) 
The foregoing examples all involve express alterations to doctrinal 
rules—alterations that carried immediate, system-wide consequences for the 
entitlements to which they attached. In Brown II, the Court formulated a rule 
of remedial law that would frustrate claimants’ ability to secure redress for the 
clearly unconstitutional conduct of maintaining segregated schooling.82 In 
Paul, the Court formulated a rule of substantive law that would frustrate cer-
tain claimants’ ability to make the required showing of constitutional harm to 
obtain damages under Section 1983.83 And in Lyons, the Court formulated a 
rule of justiciability law that would frustrate claimants’ ability to invoke the 
“judicial power” of the federal courts for purposes of securing prospective re-
lief against chokeholds and other forms of unconstitutional police behavior.84 
These cases—like many the Court decides—all resulted in discrete and identi-
fiable changes to operative doctrinal rules. 
But doctrinal equilibration need not always involve the express modifica-
tion of legal rules; the process might also involve the results-oriented applica-
tion of nominally unchanged rules in a manner that produces a consistent set of 
“entitlement-weakening” outcomes over time.85 A court might, for instance, 
routinely deny Article III standing to applicants seeking prospective vindica-
tion of a recently expanded constitutional right; it might routinely rule for the 
government on the merits in cases involving a recently created judicial reme-
dy; it might find a way to apply equitable principles (or some other set of re-
medial rules) so as to deny relief in cases involving a recently liberalized set of 
justiciability requirements; or it might seize upon a hodge-podge of such rul-
ings to minimize the entitlement’s issuance over time. Although any one such 
decision might not have much effect on the entitlement’s overall availability, 
the consistent rendering of such decisions might, over time, begin to make a 
material difference. Equilibrating effects on legal doctrine, in other words, can 
emerge not just from a single, rule-altering decision that creates claimant-
unfriendly law, but also from a pattern of rule-applying decisions that produce 
consistently claimant-unfriendly outcomes. 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See discussion supra Section I.B.1. 
 83 See discussion supra Section I.B.2. 
 84 See discussion supra Section I.B.3. 
 85 Cf. Fallon, The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies, supra note 12, at 655 (noting that 
“remedial concerns” can “influence determinations of justiciability” through “ad hoc manipulation”). 
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This last point is important because it helps to show how lower courts 
might become consequential, if not always visible, players in the equilibration 
game. Lower court judges lack the power to change Supreme Court doctrine; 
they cannot simply substitute an alternative set of decision rules for those that 
the Court has instructed them to apply. But lower court judges might some-
times manage to exploit uncertainties and ambiguities within those decisions in 
order to generate patterns of outcomes that undermine the Court’s efforts to 
shift an entitlement’s availability.86 No one such application will, on its own, 
suffice to transform the entitlement to which it attaches. But, if enough lower 
court judges apply the law in a consistently “entitlement-weakening” or “-
strengthening” direction, then the entitlement may end up acquiring a real-
world significance that differs from whatever the doctrine purports to provide. 
Emergent patterns of lower court application can thus become functionally 
identical to express alterations to the rules. 
C. The Entrenchment Asymmetry 
We are now in a position to consider the thesis of this Article: doctrinal 
equilibration tends to operate more effectively when it proceeds in an “enti-
tlement-weakening,” rather than “entitlement-strengthening,” direction. Put 
differently, courts will be able to equilibrate more effectively against unwanted 
“entitlement-strengthening” developments within the law than against unwant-
ed “entitlement-weakening” developments. And it therefore follows as a corol-
lary that “entitlement-weakening” decisions are relatively easier for their pro-
ponents to fortify against counteractive change. 
One way of seeing this point is to imagine “flipped” variations of the ex-
amples we have already considered. Suppose, counterfactually, that Brown I 
had gone the other way—i.e., that the Court had reaffirmed Plessy v. Ferguson 
and allowed the rule of “separate but equal” to remain in effect. And suppose 
further that the Court soon came to regret that decision and thus began looking 
for ways to equilibrate against it. Could the Court have pulled a “reverse 
Brown II,” indirectly undoing the effects of its earlier decision by mandating 
immediate compliance with the non-expanded right? The answer, of course, is 
no. Expedited injunctive relief in school-desegregation cases would have re-
                                                                                                                           
 86 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and Inadvert-
ence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779, 797 (2012) (“While lower 
courts do not have authority to ignore binding Supreme Court authority, lower courts can interpret 
cases in ways that are equivalent to overruling or use procedural devices, such as standing, to reach 
results in line with what the judges predict to be current Supreme Court majority preference.”); Rich-
ard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 927–36 (2016) (not-
ing the various ways in which lower courts might act to “narrow” Supreme Court precedents without 
offending vertical stare decisis norms). 
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mained valueless as long as the Constitution continued to permit segregated 
schooling. The “entitlement-weakening” effects of the earlier, rights-denying 
decision could only be undone by means of a direct reversal of the counterfac-
tual Brown I—i.e., the recognition of the right that the Court had previously 
denied. 
Suppose, again counterfactually, that the Court had never decided Monroe 
v. Pape and that Section 1983 remained a largely useless vehicle for seeking 
damages against state officials for violations of federal rights.87 And suppose 
that the Court had subsequently developed concerns that the victims of reputa-
tion-damaging government action lacked an effective means of seeking com-
pensatory redress in federal court. Would a “reverse Paul v. Davis” have suf-
ficed to address that concern?88 Again, clearly no. Holding that reputation-
damaging governmental action implicated “liberty” interests under the Due 
Process Clause would not have made it any easier for the victims of that action 
to recover damages under Section 1983. As long as the law of remedies created 
an obstacle to the vindication of that entitlement, the law of remedies itself 
required changing—the entitlement reducing effects of the remedial rule could 
not have been mitigated by a corresponding expansion of the underlying right. 
Suppose similarly that the Court had, prior to Los Angeles v. Lyons, held 
that federal courts lacked the power to impose structural injunctions against 
police departments.89 And suppose further that the Court had developed second 
thoughts about this decision and was interested in compensating for its reme-
dy-denying effect. Would a “reverse Lyons” decision have succeeded at ac-
complishing this goal? Once again, not at all. Giving more plaintiffs Article III 
standing to request a prohibited form of injunctive relief would not have 
changed the overall availability of the injunctions being sought. Instead, any 
effort to restore access to the remedy would have had to go through the law of 
remedies itself.90 
Consider finally the point as it applies more generally to the application-
focused equilibrating efforts that lower court judges might sometimes under-
take. If the Supreme Court were to deny recognition of a favored constitutional 
right, lower courts would not enjoy much success in equilibrating against that 
decision by, say, finding new ways to confer Article III standing on claimants 
alleging a violation of that right. Having cleared an initial justiciability-based 
obstacle to the adjudication of their case, those claimants would still end up 
crashing into the next obstacle before them—namely, the substantive rule that 
makes it impossible to assert a meritorious claim. If the Supreme Court were to 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See Pape, 365 U.S. at 183. 
 88 See Paul, 424 U.S. 693. 
 89 See Lyons, 461 U.S. 95. 
 90 See id. at 112–13. 
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preclude the issuance of a particular type of remedy in Eighth Amendment 
cases, expanding the scope of claimants’ Eighth Amendment right would still 
leave them unable to secure the remedy being sought. In these and other cir-
cumstances, informal equilibrating work-arounds will not suffice to overcome 
the “entitlement-weakening” effects of the decisions they are intended to tar-
get. The only way for lower courts to restore the entitlement’s availability is to 
push back directly against the “entitlement-weakening” decision itself. 
By now, we should be able to see why the equilibration process tends to 
operate more effectively in an “entitlement-weakening” direction. An entitle-
ment can issue only if every one of its component requirements is satisfied. A 
single, difficult-to-satisfy component requirement—whether situated within 
justiciability-based law, substantive law, the law of remedies, or even some-
where else—can on its own shut off access to the overarching entitlement. If a 
judge wishes to render a legal entitlement especially difficult for claimants to 
obtain, that judge can achieve that goal by rendering any one of its component 
requirements difficult for claimants to satisfy. But if a judge wishes to render a 
legal entitlement especially easy for claimants to obtain, that judge can achieve 
the goal only by ensuring that all of the component requirements remain suffi-
ciently easy for the claimant to clear.91 
Non-legal analogues to this idea are not hard to spot: a single obstruction 
on the roadway will result in a traffic jam, even if no other obstructions block 
traffic. A single blockage of a pipe will clog the drain, even where the rest of 
the pipe remains clear. And a single misaligned domino will prevent the last 
one from falling, even where all the others have been perfectly placed. But 
whatever the preferred metaphor, the central takeaway for our purposes boils 
down to the same essential claim. Where a judicial analysis must “flow” 
through several different gates along the way to the final issuance of the enti-
tlement itself, the flow can be interrupted by the closing of a single gate, and 
that interruption cannot be undone by making some other gate easier to pass 
through. 
                                                                                                                           
 91 One can hazard a more mathematically oriented representation of the same basic point. Sup-
pose that we could quantify each entitlement’s availability rate, E, as a probability value between 0 
and 1. And suppose that we knew the overall pass rates of the entitlement’s n components, c1, c2, c3, 
. . . , cn-1, cn. Because all ci are between 0 and 1, and because all ci must be satisfied in order for the 
entitlement to issue, it will always be the case that E ≤ ci, for all i between 1 and n. (If all the cs are 
independent of one another, then E = (c1)(c2)(c3) . . . (cn-1)(cn), which itself will always be less than or 
equal to each ci; in the event that the cs are partially dependent, the probability calculus will be con-
siderably more complex, but it should still be the case that the probability of all the dependent events 
happening together will never exceed the probability of any one of those events happening on its 
own.) Thus, a judge wishing to ensure that E never exceeds some value m can achieve this goal by 
changing the law associated with any ci so as to render that component’s own pass rate ≤ m as well. 
By contrast, a judge wishing to ensure that E never falls below some value m must ensure that 
(c1)(c2)(c3) . . . (cn-1)(cn) ≥ m, which will be true only if each ci ≥ m. 
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D. The Significance of the Asymmetry 
The discussion has thus far revealed that courts wishing to deny access to 
a legal entitlement can achieve their goal by focusing on any one of the enti-
tlement’s component requirements, whereas courts wishing to expand access to 
a legal entitlement often cannot do the same. But does this fact itself matter? 
Nothing I have thus far said, after all, means that “entitlement-strengthening” 
initiatives are impossible for courts to achieve. Even where equilibrating ma-
neuvers are unavailable, “entitlement-strengthening” courts still have at their 
disposal the option of directly altering or overruling the earlier, “entitlement-
weakening” changes to which they might object. Given that fact, one might 
maintain that the entrenchment asymmetry—though formally present within 
the law—has limited real-world significance. If it is always possible for judges 
to do something to achieve their entitlement-related objectives, then why 
should we worry about whether the equilibration process itself better conduces 
to “entitlement-weakening” change? 
Put another way, before we begin to examine the nature of the entrench-
ment asymmetry and the conditions under which it is most likely to arise, we 
should first ask whether, and in what respects, the asymmetry itself is likely to 
matter. How and to what extent does the asymmetry confer real-world ad-
vantages on judges’ efforts to weaken the entitlements they disfavor and real-
world disadvantages on judges’ efforts to strengthen the entitlements they like? 
This Section highlights two respects in which that might be the case.92 
1. The Choice-of-Adjustment Advantage 
Consider first the position of two judges wishing to alter the overall avail-
ability of some legal entitlement: one judge (“Stringent”), wishes to render the 
entitlement difficult for claimants to secure. Another judge (“Generous”), 
wishes to render the entitlement easier to secure. The discussion thus far sug-
gests that Stringent can always achieve an “entitlement-weakening” outcome 
by making a single downward adjustment to any one of the entitlement’s con-
stituent components. Generous, by contrast, will often face a more constrained 
set of choices. If Generous confronts a legal entitlement whose overall difficul-
ty derives largely from one, difficult-to-clear component requirement—e.g., a 
rule of Article III standing that makes it very difficult for the relevant claim-
ants to demonstrate an “injury in fact”—then Generous has no choice but to 
focus on that particularly problematic component. Just as one cannot compen-
sate for a weak link in the chain by making another link stronger, Generous 
cannot neutralize the effects of an especially stringent component requirement 
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by making some other component requirement easier for claimants to satisfy. 
Generous, unlike Stringent, has no real choice as to which component require-
ment to target for reform. Rather, Generous must target the particular compo-
nent requirement(s) most responsible for the entitlement’s low-availability 
state. 
Call this the choice-of-adjustment advantage: no matter the default ar-
rangement of a legal entitlement and its constituent components, and no matter 
how claimant- or government-friendly those components’ respective legal re-
quirements might be, an “entitlement-weakening” judge can always substan-
tially reduce an entitlement’s availability by manipulating the law associated 
with any one of its constituent parts. An “entitlement-strengthening” judge, by 
contrast, will very often lack that freedom of choice. 
Still, one might ask, why should that difference matter? Stringent and 
Generous can both ultimately get where they want to go; it is just that Gener-
ous must sometimes take a predetermined route to that destination and Strin-
gent can always take any number of different routes. But that fact itself is sig-
nificant because not all adjustments are equally easy for judges to achieve. 
Suppose, for instance, that the law associated with one component requirement 
derives from a Supreme Court decision that leaves no uncertainty as to its 
scope and substance. And suppose that the law associated with some other 
component requirement derives from a vague set of gestures and dicta that the 
Court has offered over a series of cases. All else equal, the unsettled law 
should be easier for judges to “adjust” than the settled law, and the choice-of-
adjustment advantage means that judges like Stringent will have more freedom 
to target unsettled areas of the law.93 Suppose, similarly, that the law associated 
with one component requirement takes the form of a bright-line rule whereas 
the law associated with another component requirement takes the form of an 
open-ended standard. All else equal, the open-ended standard will afford equil-
ibrating judges more room within which to push the law in their preferred di-
rection. And the choice-of-adjustment advantage means that judges like Strin-
gent will more often be able to avail themselves of this opportunity.94 In gen-
eral, the freedom to choose which component requirement to target should car-
ry along with it the freedom to target those requirements that will be easiest for 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Re, supra note 86, at 938 (noting that there “should be more room for considering nonprec-
edential arguments about legal correctness as the lower court becomes more uncertain about the mean-
ing of the most relevant Supreme Court precedent”). 
 94 See Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 684 (2014) (“A standard-
like formulation of a Supreme Court holding will ‘decide less’ than a rule-like formulation, thereby 
providing lower courts with a greater degree of freedom to continue experimenting with the substance 
of the doctrine under review.”). 
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the judge to adjust. And this is a freedom that the “entitlement-weakening” 
judge is more often more likely to enjoy. 
2. The Fortification Advantage 
The choice-of-adjustment advantage concerns offensive, attack-minded 
maneuvers by judges attempting to move the law in an “entitlement-
strengthening” or “entitlement-weakening” direction. But the entrenchment 
asymmetry also affects these judges’ defensive ability to fortify their changes 
against subsequent forms of counteractive action. Specifically, having effec-
tively shut down an entitlement with a single change to one of its component 
requirements, a judge can go on to hammer home the effects of that decision 
by rendering others of its component requirements equally difficult for claim-
ants to clear. From the claimant’s perspective, these changes will not make 
much of a difference—if a justiciability-based hurdle already precludes judi-
cial vindication of the claim, then it will not matter much whether that same 
claim could also have been rejected on other, non-justiciability-based grounds. 
But fortifying changes could still make a difference in terms of frustrating future 
judicial efforts to restore the entitlement’s availability back to its original level. 
The higher the number of component requirements that are simultaneously drag-
ging down an entitlement’s overall availability rate, the higher the number of 
component requirements that must be altered or adjusted before access to the 
entitlement is restored. Thus, fortifying adjustments to the entitlement’s other 
components can increase the costs of “entitlement-strengthening” change. 
Recall, for instance, the Court’s proclamation in Lyons that the requested 
form of injunctive relief should not have issued even in the event that Lyons 
had possessed standing to request it.95 As far as the claimants own interests 
were concerned, this was something of a moot point: future claimants like Ly-
ons were seldom going to satisfy the standing portion of the Court’s decision, 
so the applicable equitable principles were unlikely to have much of an effect 
on their ability to obtain the injunction itself.96 Still, the remedial portion of the 
Lyons opinion did something meaningful. It further fortified the decision’s “en-
titlement-weakening” effects against subsequent judicial undoing. Any subse-
quent effort to push back against Lyons would have had to grapple with both 
its adverse holding about standing and its adverse holding about remedies. 
Lower courts seeking to “get around” Lyons would similarly have to find a 
way of manipulating two component requirements rather than one. Supple-
menting a claimant-unfriendly justiciability component with an equally claim-
ant-unfriendly remedial component would not have done much to render the 
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 96 Id. at 134–35 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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already-weakened entitlement significantly more difficult for claimants to ob-
tain. But it might still have carried the strategic advantage of making the enti-
tlement-denying effects of the decision more difficult for courts to undo. 
When it comes to “entitlement-strengthening” change, by contrast, the 
fortification options are more limited. Even if a court does everything to ensure 
that every single one of the entitlement’s component requirements operates in a 
claimant-friendly manner, the entitlement itself can still be materially weak-
ened by a single counteractive adjustment to just one of its constituent compo-
nents. To be sure, the court seeking to ensure access to the entitlement can 
strive to make all of its component requirements difficult for subsequent judg-
es to manipulate or adjust. But that judge can do nothing to increase the num-
ber of component requirements that any “entitlement-weakening” effort would 
have to work through. The most claimant-friendly entitlement imaginable will 
always be just a single, component-specific adjustment away from availability-
reducing change. 
In other words, maximum fortification against “entitlement-strengthen-
ing” change will yield several, difficult-to-change component requirements, all 
of which must be “switched” before the entitlement once again becomes acces-
sible to the claimants seeking to secure it. Maximum fortification against “enti-
tlement-weakening” change will also yield several, difficult-to-change compo-
nent requirements, only one of which must be “switched” before the entitle-
ment once again becomes inaccessible to the claimants seeking to secure it. 
“Entitlement-weakening” judges can thus force their adversaries to work 
through a large number of different, government-friendly component require-
ments; “entitlement-strengthening” judges, by contrast, will always find their 
creations just a single, component-specific adjustment away from being taken 
away.97 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Obviously, the fortification advantage matters only if we assume that it is costlier for judges to 
render multiple adjustments to multiple component requirements than it is for judges to render a single 
adjustment to a single component requirement. That relationship, to be sure, is not quite so straight-
forward, and one can certainly imagine circumstances in which the costs of making one adjustment 
exceed the costs of making multiple adjustments. Some doctrinal adjustments will be significantly 
easier than others to achieve, and several “easy” adjustments may well be collectively “cheaper” to 
pursue than a single “difficult” adjustment in the opposite direction. What is more, modifications to 
multiple doctrinal adjustments might sometimes yield diminishing marginal costs over time. Once a 
judge has rendered one change to one area of the law, additional changes to additional areas of the law 
may become relatively less expensive for the judge to pursue. 
 All of that said, it is not implausible to maintain that changes to multiple areas of law will often 
impose costs that are essentially “additive” in nature—costs, that is, for which it will be generally 
(though not always) true that the judge who needs to adjust or manipulate component requirements 
must expend a greater degree of judicial capital than the judge who needs to adjust or manipulate only 
one component requirement. For example, the judge who must make multiple changes might incur 
extra costs in terms of the added level of time and effort needed to devise and implement a plausible 
legal “workaround” to precedent that militates against a desired change (and, if necessary, to persuade 
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II. THE ASYMMETRY’S DEPENDENCIES 
The previous Part provided some reason to think that efforts at doctrinal 
equilibration tend to work more effectively in an “entitlement-weakening” direc-
tion. “Entitlement-weakening” judges, unlike their “entitlement-strengthening” 
counterparts, can always affect the overall availability of an entitlement by 
altering whichever one of its component requirements is most amenable to 
manipulation, and those same judges can more effectively fortify their own 
adjustments to that entitlement against subsequent, countervailing change. The 
choice-of-adjustment advantage and the fortification advantage thus combine 
to produce a baseline scenario in which entitlements are more vulnerable to 
contraction rather than expansion.98 
This all remains a fairly bare-bones picture, and we have not yet consid-
ered some additional doctrinal variables that add further nuance. This Part thus 
turns to that task. Specifically, it highlights three important variables on which 
the magnitude of the entrenchment asymmetry will depend: (1) the number of 
component requirements that the entitlement comprises;99 (2) the extent to 
which stare decisis norms constrain judges’ ability to alter and manipulate the 
                                                                                                                           
other colleagues to go along with the change). Cf. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: 
The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 626 
(2001) (“By relying on past decisions, judges can save significant time and effort . . . . Judges can turn 
to past analyses and avoid rethinking every aspect of a decision.”); Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. 
Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 639 (2003) (“Judges 
will often accept the current state, which is represented by precedent, because to do otherwise would 
require significant cognitive effort.”). Second, if the contemplated workaround is sufficiently tenden-
tious as a matter of law, the judge risks incurring reputational costs among that judge’s peers. Cf. Eric 
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1777 (2013) 
(highlighting the possibility that “if judges too obviously implement their preferences, they will harm 
their reputations so greatly that the reputational costs to the judge will exceed the ideological benefits” 
and that, as a consequence, judges “will want to avoid implementing their preferences when doing so 
is too obvious, and in these cases decide in a neutral or nonideological fashion”). Furthermore, if the 
judge serves on a lower court, that judge might worry about the risk of facing reversal on appeal, a 
risk that increases alongside the number of contestable “manipulations” of the law that the lower court 
decides to make. See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 1755, 1771 (2013) (“Reversals can impose real resource costs on trial judges in the form of new 
trials and motions on remand, and they can impose reputational costs as well.”). Some of these costs 
may matter more than others, and some of the costs may carry diminishing marginal effects as the 
cost-creating activities start to add up. But my intuition is that all of these costs are at least “additive” 
in a rough sense—thus supporting the idea that, in general, a judge will incur more costs when pursu-
ing multiple changes to multiple component requirements than when pursuing a single change to a 
single such requirement. 
 98 See discussion supra Section I.D. 
 99 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
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law;100 and (3) the extent to which an entitlement’s procedural and remedial 
components apply uniformly across multiple, different substantive rights.101 
A. Component Numerosity 
Most fundamentally, the extent of the entrenchment asymmetry will de-
pend on the degree of compartmentalization that exists within the entitlement 
itself. Call this the variable of “component numerosity.” All else equal, an enti-
tlement whose availability depends on the satisfaction of a small number of 
component requirements should be less sensitive to the bias than an entitle-
ment whose availability depends on a large number of component require-
ments. The more that courts have divvied up the entitlement into separate and 
independent parts, the greater the equilibrating advantage that opponents of the 
entitlement will enjoy. 
To see the point, imagine a legal entitlement consisting of one and only 
one component requirement. Rather than require the joint satisfaction of dis-
cretely “procedural,” “substantive,” and “remedial” parts, the law governing 
this entitlement’s availability calls for the application of a single and holistic 
entitlement-specific test—one that blends together all the traditionally dis-
aggregated concepts of procedural, substantive, and remedial law.102 Under this 
test, claimants might be able to overcome a relatively weak showing of injury 
by asserting an especially strong substantive claim, they might be able to over-
come a dubious substantive claim with a compelling demonstration of irrepa-
rable harm, and they might otherwise manage to compensate for one set of de-
ficiencies in their claim by emphasizing countervailing strengths somewhere 
else. The idea, in short, would be to replace an existing, regimented test that 
required plaintiffs to “check all the boxes” with a new sort of totality-of-the-
circumstances test that simply awarded the requisite entitlement to only those 
individuals who, all things considered, merited judicial intervention on their 
behalf. 
A truly de-compartmentalized doctrine of this sort would eliminate the 
possibility of doctrinal equilibration and thus, along with it, the asymmetric 
entrenchment of entitlements. If each entitlement’s availability turned on the 
content of an all-things-considered test, then both proponents and opponents of 
the entitlement would have no choice but to pursue their desired adjustments 
within the confines of that test. And there is no immediate reason to suppose 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 101 See discussion infra Section II.C. 
 102 See Michael Coenen, Spillover Across Remedies, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1211, 1221 (2014) (imag-
ining “hybridized rules of ‘right-remedy’ law, whose content depends on both the type of relief a 
litigant demands and the type of substantive claim she asserts”). 
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that such a test in isolation would be inherently more amenable to “entitle-
ment-weakening” or “entitlement-strengthening” change. That is not to say 
that a freewheeling and holistic test would be any less immune to results-
oriented manipulation—indeed, all else equal, the test would likely be more 
manipulable than one that prescribes a compartmentalized inquiry. But—and 
this is the key point—the test itself would be equally manipulable in both di-
rections. 
Of course, the rules governing access to public-law entitlements do not 
typically assume such a simplified, holistic form. Instead, these rules emerge 
from the linking together of discretely defined procedural, substantive, and 
remedial “components,” all of which must individually be satisfied in order for 
the underlying entitlement to issue. Thus, for instance, securing a permanent 
injunction against an alleged substantive-due-process violation depends not on 
the satisfaction of a holistically defined “injunction-for-substantive-due-
process-violation” test;103 rather, it depends on the claimant’s satisfaction of 
threshold justiciability-related limits, merits-based rules defining the scope of 
the right itself, and remedy-based limits on the issuance of injunctive relief. 
And once the chain of component requirements becomes linked in this way, 
the possibility of equilibration (and the asymmetry hard wired into it) begins to 
emerge. 
But the relationship between equilibration and compartmentalization does 
not end there. Equally important is the point that the extent of the asymmetry 
should increase alongside the overall number of component requirements that 
the claimant must clear. 
Consider first the choice-of-adjustment advantage, which derives from 
the fact that the “entitlement-weakening” judge, but not the “entitlement-
strengthening” judge, is free to target any component requirement as the driver 
of a desired equilibrating change. That advantage should grow more pro-
nounced as the number of potential targets grows higher. The more component 
requirements there are for an “entitlement-weakening” judge to choose from, 
the easier it is for the judge to disrupt the entitlement’s regular issuance.104 
                                                                                                                           
 103 In that sense, one might say that public-law doctrine has adopted a “modular” design. See 
Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1175, 1176 (2006) (“In general, modularity is a device to deal with complexity by decomposing a 
complex system into pieces (modules), in which communications (or other interdependencies) are 
intense within the module but sparse and standardized across modules.”); see also Henry E. Smith, 
Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1701–02 (2012). 
 104 Suppose, for instance, that a prior decision about mootness doctrine has greatly increased the 
availability of a particular legal entitlement. If that entitlement consists of only a few other component 
requirements—say, an Article III standing component, a single rule of substantive law, and a single 
remedial rule—then it is not especially unlikely that these other areas of doctrine will already be re-
sistant to manipulation or adjustment, and the “entitlement-weakening” judge would thus be unable to 
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Contrastingly, the “entitlement-weakening” judge—who must always target 
those component requirements most responsible for the entitlement’s low-
availability state—will not face any easier of a task when the number of com-
ponent requirements is high. 
Component numerosity should affect the fortification advantage as well. 
That advantage exists to the extent that an “entitlement-weakening” judge can 
increase an entitlement’s resistance to counteractive equilibration by redun-
dantly rendering all (or at least many) of its component requirements difficult 
for claimants to clear. Obviously, as the number of component requirements 
goes up, so too should the extent of the fortification advantage. If an entitle-
ment consists of only three component requirements, then there will not be 
many potential redundancies for the “entitlement-weakening” judge to exploit. 
If, by contrast, the entitlement consists of many more requirements, then the 
judge can make it much more resistant to counteractive, “entitlement-
strengthening” change. 
All of this helps to confirm what should intuitively be clear: as the number 
of an entitlement’s component requirements increases, so too does the workload 
of the judge who hopes to prevent the entitlement from becoming less available. 
An entitlement consisting of numerous component requirements is like an army 
stretched thin across expansive territory, easy to attack and hard to defend. 
B. Stare Decisis Norms 
The extent of the entrenchment asymmetry will also depend on the 
strength of stare decisis norms. That point follows naturally from the fact that 
stare decisis norms operate as a major determinant of any doctrinal adjust-
ment’s cost. All else equal, a judge wishing to modify the law associated with a 
particular component requirement should have an easier time doing so when 
the judge can more easily evade, narrow, ignore, distinguish, or otherwise 
wriggle out of precedential dictates to the contrary.105 Where courts can easily 
“get around” prior decisions dictating the stringency (or non-stringency) of a 
given component requirement, equilibrating adjustments should prove relative-
                                                                                                                           
achieve the desired equilibrating change. But if the entitlement consists of many other component 
requirements—say, an Article III standing component, a “cause of action” component, an exhaustion 
component, an “abstention” component, several different “substantive” components, and several dif-
ferent remedial components—then the equilibrating effort should become easier for the judge to 
achieve. 
 105 See F. Andrew Hessick, Doctrinal Redundancies, 67 ALA. L. REV. 635, 657 (2016) (noting 
that “courts face significant constraints in experimenting with doctrine because of the nature of prece-
dent”); Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 531 (2008) (“Stare 
decisis raises the cost of judicial policymaking . . . by encouraging or requiring judges to follow prec-
edents.”). 
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ly easy for those courts to achieve. Where the courts cannot so easily do so, 
such adjustments will require an increased (and eventually, prohibitively high) 
expenditure of judicial capital. 
At first glance, the strength of stare decisis norms might seem irrelevant to 
the equilibration-related asymmetry that this Article has described. Stare decisis 
norms, after all, can operate to prevent both “entitlement-strengthening” and 
“entitlement-weakening” judges from changing the law to accord with their 
preferences, and it is not immediately clear why the variable would affect the 
two judges in materially different ways.106 But when the possibility of equili-
bration enters the picture, stare decisis norms can yield different consequences 
for different types of change. Specifically, an especially lenient set of stare de-
cisis norms should tend to “level the playing field” between “entitlement-
weakening” and “entitlement-strengthening” judges, and an especially strin-
gent set of stare decisis norms should tend to do the same. It is only where 
such norms fall between these extremes—imposing meaningful costs on legal 
change but not going so far as to prevent legal change altogether—that “enti-
tlement-strengthening” judges should gain a material advantage over their “en-
titlement-weakening” counterparts. 
To see that point, consider first the extreme scenario of a doctrinal regime 
that adheres to a sweeping and absolute rule of stare decisis, such that courts 
are categorically prohibited not just from overruling their own decisions (and, 
in the case of lower courts, disregarding higher-court decisions), but from do-
ing anything that “changes” the application of the law away from a status quo 
baseline.107 If the doctrine were truly frozen to this degree, then both “entitle-
ment-weakening” and “entitlement-strengthening” judges would find it equally 
impossible to pursue the adjustments they desired. Indeed, the entire possibil-
ity of equilibration would vanish altogether, as equilibrating maneuvers in both 
directions would find themselves equally subject to the absolute-stare-decisis 
bar. 
Now consider the opposite extreme: a scenario in which law is maximally 
fluid, such that changes to legal doctrine are effectively costless for judges to 
render. Here too, the entrenchment asymmetry would cease to exist. Yes, the 
“entitlement-weakening” judge would still enjoy a choice-of-adjustment ad-
vantage over the “entitlement-strengthening” judge. But if all changes are 
equally costless for judges to render, then the “entitlement-weakening” judge 
would not gain anything meaningful from the advantage. A similar point holds 
for the fortification advantage as well: “entitlement-weakening” judges might 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See Hessick, supra note 105, at 657. 
 107 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and 
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 871 (2004). 
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more often manage to force their “entitlement-strengthening” counterparts to 
work through “multiple” component requirements on the way to restoring an 
altered entitlement back to a high-availability state. But if the cost of each ad-
justment is zero, then the aggregate cost of all those adjustments will be zero 
as well.108 If judges have infinite power to ignore, disregard, and alter past 
precedents, then anything and everything should become equally up for grabs 
in each and every case.109 
But between those two extreme scenarios, the entrenchment asymmetry 
should become apparent. Both the choice-of-adjustment advantage and the for-
tification advantage, that is, assume greater importance under circumstances 
where the costs of legal change are significant enough to preclude some ad-
justments to the law but not others. Where this is so, an “entitlement-
strengthening” judge will face greater difficulty in increasing an entitlement’s 
overall availability, because the “entitlement-strengthening” judge will more 
often have to reckon with particular component requirements that the operative 
stare decisis norms have rendered prohibitively costly to change. The “entitle-
ment-weakening” judge, by contrast, will more often be able to find at least 
one component requirement that, under the operative stare decisis norms, is 
relatively amenable to manipulation.110 And, to the extent that the “entitle-
ment-weakening” judge is further able to fortify a disfavored entitlement 
against “entitlement-strengthening” change, the fortifications should exert a 
meaningful, additive impact on that judge’s adversaries’ efforts to increase its 
availability in future cases. 
The relationship between the entrenchment asymmetry and stare decisis 
norms might thus be roughly represented by a parabolic curve. As the overall 
rigidity of the law increases from a point of absolute manipulability, the extent 
of the asymmetry should increase along with it. But at some point, the asym-
metry will “max out” and its magnitude should diminish as the law tends to-
wards a point of rigidity. The asymmetry should thus be most pronounced 
somewhere between these two extremes. 
C. Trans-Substantivity 
We have thus far spoken as if the particular component requirements that 
combine to form legal entitlements reflect distinctive bodies of entitlement-
                                                                                                                           
 108 Indeed, nothing would prevent the “entitlement-strengthening” judge from simply “liberating” 
the entitlement from various component requirements on which its issuance previously depended. 
 109 Cf. Hessick, supra note 105, at 666 (“The ability of courts to choose among different redun-
dant doctrine raises the possibility of cycling, which may lead to instability in the law or making it 
easier for judges to manipulate the outcome in cases.”). 
 110 See Re, supra note 86, at 932 (discussing the tool of narrowing to “construe precedential am-
biguities in favor of [judges’] own first-principles view of the law”). 
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specific law. In reality, however, these bodies of law overlap and intersect with 
one another in complex and consequential ways. Specifically, many procedural 
and remedial rules enjoy a “trans-substantive” scope of operation, carrying a 
uniform set of definitions and doctrinal requirements across varying substan-
tive domains.111 Thus, for instance, the same three-part Article III standing test 
applies regardless of whether a plaintiff pursues a Fourth Amendment, Fifth 
Amendment, or statutory claim;112 the same set of pleading requirements ap-
plies regardless of whether a plaintiff challenges a law on free speech grounds, 
equal protection grounds, or on some other theory of unconstitutionality;113 the 
same qualified immunity principles apply regardless of the nature of the gov-
ernment actor’s wrongdoing,114 and so forth.115 And that in turn means that 
changes to the content of procedural and remedial norms as they apply within 
one substantive context will carry with them immediate implications for other 
substantive rights as well, “spilling over,” as it were, into substantive domains 
far afield from the particular one that initially provoked the change.116 
The trans-substantive nature of procedural and remedial rules may func-
tion as a natural, built-in check on judges’ willingness to manipulate judicial 
doctrine for entitlement-specific purposes. Restricting the availability of in-
junctive relief might initially appear to be a promising means of counteracting 
an earlier expansion of a disfavored legal entitlement that depends on prospec-
tive judicial enforcement. But if the rules governing injunctive relief are trans-
substantive in scope, then that same restriction will have the automatic effect 
of weakening numerous other legal entitlements that also depend on prospec-
tive enforcement. This includes, most importantly, entitlements involving other 
substantive rights that an equilibrating judge would prefer to continue enforc-
ing. Thus, if the trans-substantive implications of a doctrinal adjustment are 
significant and obvious enough, a judge initially inclined to equilibrate for the 
purposes of weakening a disfavored entitlement may ultimately choose not to 
act. The contemplated change, after all, would inflict collateral damage on oth-
                                                                                                                           
 111 See Michael Coenen, Constitutional Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 683, 691–92 (2013). 
 112 See Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 441 (2017) 
(“The Supreme Court has treated Article III standing as a trans-substantive requirement that must be 
met in every case.”). 
 113 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 8. But see, e.g., id. R. 9(b) (imposing heightened pleading stand-
ards in cases involving “fraud or mistake”). 
 114 See Jeffries, supra note 64, at 262 (noting, with respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that “[s]o far as 
appears, all remedies are available for all rights on the same terms,” while proceeding to criticize this 
trend). 
 115 See generally David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal 
Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 426 (2010) (noting that trans-substantivity “remains robust” 
as a guiding principle for the design of the federal rules). 
 116 See Coenen, supra note 102, at 1223–47. 
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er legal entitlements that the judge favors, and it would thus become, from that 
judge’s perspective, a change not worth pursuing.117 
 If trans-substantivity operates to deter courts from equilibrating, then 
trans-substantivity might also operate to narrow the entrenchment asymmetry 
itself. The asymmetry exists because “entitlement-weakening” judges can easi-
ly undo or reverse prior, availability-increasing changes to an entitlement by 
targeting any one of its several component requirements for availability-
reducing change. But if all of these component requirements derive from genu-
inely trans-substantive bodies of law, then concerns about spillover and collat-
eral damage may often function to render this option infeasible. An “entitle-
ment-weakening” judge, for instance, might initially consider adjusting quali-
fied immunity doctrine to cut off access to a disfavored substantive right. But, 
if the adjustment would also jeopardize the after-the-fact enforcement of other, 
substantive rights that the same judge favors, then the judge will in fact have 
fewer equilibrating options available. And the fewer the equilibrating options 
the “entitlement-weakening” judge has available, the lesser the extent of that 
judge’s equilibrating advantage. 
Having said all of that, we should be careful not to overstate trans-
substantivity’s importance. Its effects are limited by an oft-present disconnect 
between rhetoric and reality: even where procedural and remedial rules purport 
to apply without differentiation across varying substantive domains, those 
same rules will remain subject to manipulations and adjustments that, as a real-
world matter, do not extend beyond particular substantive domains.118 Judges 
might, for instance, be more likely to apply an especially restrictive version of 
Article III standing principles in national-security cases but not in election-law 
cases.119 They might be more inclined to find nonjusticiable political questions 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Marcus, supra note 115, at 379 (“Rules designed to apply equally across doctrinal catego-
ries require a level of abstraction that prevent[s] them from explicitly expressing or manifesting a 
judgment as to the value of one area or another of substantive law.”). There is an analogy here, albeit 
somewhat rough, to Justice Jackson’s defense of generality as a desideratum of substantive lawmak-
ing. See Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112–13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) (noting that “there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable 
government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority 
must be imposed generally” and that “nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to 
allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to 
escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected”). 
 118 And that is to say nothing of procedural and remedial rules that are, by their own terms, sub-
stance-specific in application. See Fallon, The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies, supra 
note 12, at 673–78, 688 (characterizing First Amendment overbreadth doctrine and taxpayer standing 
doctrine as reflecting explicitly substance-specific glosses on otherwise generally applicable rules). 
 119 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1071 (2015) 
(noting that Article III standing doctrine, although “aspir[ing] to trans-substantivity,” nonetheless 
“fractures along substantive lines in important, identifiable categories of cases”). Compare, e.g., Clap-
per v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 402 (2013) (no standing to challenge NSA surveillance pro-
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in cases involving partisan gerrymandering than in cases involving race-based 
gerrymandering.120 Courts and judges might more often find violations of 
clearly established law in cases involving free speech claims than in cases in-
volving excessive force claims.121 And so forth.122 Simply put, some rules may 
turn out to be far more trans-substantive on the books than they are on the 
ground. And the less trans-substantive these rules turn out to be on the ground, 
the less often they will deter courts from pursuing the sorts of equilibrating 
adjustments that undergird the entrenchment asymmetry itself. 
In addition, the trans-substantive scope of procedural and remedial rules 
might sometimes have the effect of incentivizing rather than deterring equili-
brating adjustments. Sometimes, to be sure, the trans-substantive effects of a 
contemplated alteration to the law will suffice to dissuade judges from acting 
on an equilibration impulse: a judge otherwise inclined to shut down a disfa-
vored legal entitlement may ultimately decide to stand pat for fear of undercut-
ting other legal entitlements that the same judge supports. Under other circum-
stances, however, an adjustment’s amplified effects will fail to deter, either 
because the equilibrating judge simply fails to anticipate the down-the-road 
effects of a one-off decision, or because the judge views those widespread ef-
fects as all the more reason to make the contemplated change. (If, say, a judge 
dislikes 80% of the entitlements that depend on a given remedial rule, then the 
judge may regard damage done to the favored 20% as a price well worth pay-
ing for the damage done to the disfavored 80%.) When a single adjustment to 
one entitlement generates significant spillover effects across others, the pro-
spect of spillover may sometimes increase rather than reduce the attractiveness 
of the change to the judge who mulls it over. 
                                                                                                                           
gram), with Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 161 (2014) (standing to challenge state 
prohibition on false statements during political campaigns). 
 120 Compare, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019) (holding partisan 
gerrymandering claims to present nonjusticiable political questions), with id. at 2488 (noting that 
“[r]acial discrimination in districting . . . raises constitutional issues that can be addressed by the fed-
eral courts”). 
 121 Cf. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (holding that factual specificity in defining 
the “clearly established law” is “especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the 
Court has recognized that ‘it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal 
doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts’” (quoting Sauc-
ier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001))). 
 122 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportuni-
ties of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 48 (2010) (“Many, if not most, of the Federal Rules [of 
Civil Procedure] are charters for discretionary decisionmaking, setting boundaries and leaving the 
actual choices to federal trial judges. To that extent, they are only superficially uniform and superfi-
cially transsubstantive.”). 
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III. OVERCOMING THE ASYMMETRY 
The previous Part considered various ways in which basic features of 
public-law doctrine contribute to the asymmetric entrenchment of legal enti-
tlements. That Part concluded that the extent of the asymmetry is likely to vary 
from context to context, affecting some legal entitlements more acutely than oth-
ers. But even where the asymmetry exists in especially severe form, “entitle-
ment-strengthening” judges might still find ways of fighting back against it.123 
This Part in particular considers three potential means by which judges 
might manage to pursue and protect claimant-friendly changes to their pre-
ferred entitlements, overcoming (or at least mitigating) the competitive ad-
vantage that their “entitlement-weakening” counterparts might otherwise en-
joy. First, “entitlement-strengthening” judges might attempt to compensate for 
an entitlement’s low availability by scaling upward the value of its underlying 
remedy.124 Second, judges might exploit “definitional linkages” that exist 
across an entitlement’s component requirements in an effort to undo the effects 
of an “entitlement-weakening” change.125 And finally, such judges might re-
spond to the weakening of one entitlement by developing and propping up oth-
er, “substitute” entitlements that help to promote values and objectives associ-
ated with the entitlement being undermined.126 
A. Scaling Remedies Upward 
We have thus far described legal entitlements on the assumption that they 
govern access to remedies of a fixed and unchangeable value; we have as-
sumed, in other words, that equilibrating judges can alter the availability of an 
entitlement’s underlying remedy, but not the overall value of the remedy itself. 
Under some circumstances, that assumption makes sense: it is difficult (though 
perhaps not impossible) to imagine reforms to the declaratory judgment reme-
dy that might render it more or less desirable for claimants to secure,127 just as 
it is difficult (though perhaps not impossible) to imagine reforms to the exclu-
sionary rule that would render an act of evidentiary exclusion more or less val-
uable to the defendant in a criminal case. But other remedies do not so obvi-
ously operate in such a binary on/off fashion—they enjoy a sort of scalability 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See discussion supra Part II. 
 124 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 125 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 126 See discussion infra Section III.C. 
 127 Although, one possibility might involve the extent to which a declaratory judgment is given 
issue preclusive effect. See Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE 
L.J. 1091, 1113–20 (2014) (discussing the possibility that declaratory judgments carry “less issue-
preclusive effect” than injunctions, though noting that this position currently enjoys only “slender 
support”). 
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that courts might also try to manipulate on behalf of their entitlement-specific 
aims. Monetary relief can be made more or less valuable through alterations to, 
say, the rules governing permissible ratios for punitive damages,128 the eviden-
tiary prerequisites for presumed damages,129 and the methods of quantifying 
compensatory harm.130 Injunctions can be more or less valuable through rules 
governing the consequences of noncompliance,131 the specificity and duration 
of their dictates,132 and the scope of their applicability.133 Where these and oth-
er remedies come into play,134 courts can pursue doctrinal adjustments that af-
fect not only the frequency with which a remedy issues, but also the costs to 
the government and benefits to the plaintiff that flow from the remedy’s issu-
ance. 
The scalability of remedies might sometimes afford “entitlement-strengthen-
ing” judges a useful means of overcoming the entrenchment asymmetry. Con-
sider again our two hypothetical judges: Generous, who favors a particular en-
titlement and wants to do everything possible to maximize its availability, and 
Stringent, who disfavors that entitlement and wants to do everything possible 
to minimize its availability. As we have already seen, Generous is less well-
positioned than Stringent to manipulate the entitlement’s availability in the 
desired direction. But consider now the possibility that Generous and Stringent 
can also manipulate the value of the remedy at the end of the chain. That pos-
sibility gives Generous a new means of resisting Stringent’s efforts to make the 
entitlement go away. Even where the entitlement only rarely is awarded, Gen-
                                                                                                                           
 128 See, e.g., BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996). 
 129 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). 
 130 See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978) (“[A]lthough mental and emotional dis-
tress caused by the denial of procedural due process itself is compensable under § 1983, we hold that 
neither the likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving it is so great as to justify awarding 
compensatory damages without proof that such injury actually was caused.”). 
 131 See, e.g., Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of Equitable Discre-
tion, 15 NEV. L.J. 1397, 1438–40 (2015); see also Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990) 
(noting that a judge’s choice of sanction for contempt is limited to using “the least possible power 
adequate to the end proposed” (internal quotation omitted)). 
 132 See Rendleman, supra note 131, at 1437 (“Even after the judge decides to grant the plaintiff an 
injunction, the question of timing remains.”). 
 133 See, e.g., John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) Than “Off Switches”: Patent-
Infringement Injunctions’ Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1401–02 (2012) (noting that “injunctions can 
take any of a number of different shapes having differing degrees of effectiveness” and that “[e]ven if 
there is no debate over the timing and duration of an injunction, there can be debate over an injunc-
tion’s scope—i.e., over the extent and nature of the matter and activities that an injunction forbids or 
requires”). 
 134 To take another example, the rules regarding attorney’s fees might be similarly manipulated to 
incentivize (or not incentivize) the bringing of constitutional cases. See Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming 
the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 205 (“Attorney’s fees are the fuel that drives 
the private attorney general engine.”). 
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erous can at least strive to ensure that the awarding of the entitlement is a very 
big deal. 
This matters in two respects. First, scaling the remedy upwards allows 
Generous to ensure that the entitlement continues to deter government action 
that would violate the operative substantive rule. Suppose, for instance, that 
Stringent manages to reduce one of an entitlement’s components’ pass rates 
from 50% down to 10%, thus effectuating a fivefold decrease to the entitle-
ment’s overall availability, and suppose further that Generous lacks any means 
of restoring the entitlement’s availability rate back to its original level. If the 
underlying remedy is scalable, then Generous can still prevent Stringent’s five-
fold reduction in the entitlement’s availability rate from translating into a five-
fold reduction in the remedy’s overall deterrent force. Specifically, if Generous 
can effectuate a fivefold increase to the costs that the remedy inflicts on gov-
ernment actors—such as by prescribing an especially capacious measure of 
compensatory harm or by making a structural injunction especially costly for 
the government to comply with—then Generous might still end up neutralizing 
the deterrent-based effects of Stringent’s initial change. From the government’s 
perspective, an entitlement that yields a large number of small remedial costs 
may deter just as effectively as does an entitlement that yields a small number 
of large remedial costs: under both scenarios, the entitlement’s (negative) ex-
pected value should remain largely the same. 
In addition, by scaling an entitlement’s remedy upward, Generous might 
also manage to expand the pool of claimants who choose to press for the enti-
tlement in court. The size of that pool will depend not just on the probability of 
the entitlement’s issuance but also on the size of the payoff that a prevailing 
plaintiff receives. As the entitlement’s positive expected value increases, so too 
should the number of claimants who view an attempt to secure it as worth their 
while to pursue. And an increase in attempts should yield a corresponding in-
crease in successful attempts, which should in turn help to ensure that more of 
the entitlement’s intended beneficiaries ultimately get their rights vindicated in 
court. 
That said, the “remedy scaling” strategy can only offer so much to the 
“entitlement-strengthening” judge. For one thing, remedies can just as easily 
be scaled downward as upward, and there is no immediate reason to suppose 
that “entitlement-weakening” judges would not be able to employ the same 
remedy scaling strategy to their own advantage.135 What is more, even where 
                                                                                                                           
 135 Indeed, one might well conceptualize the Court’s “entitlement-weakening” decision in Brown 
II as proceeding along these lines. See supra Section I.B.1. The Court in Brown II did not so much 
restrict the plaintiffs’ ability to obtain injunctions against segregated schooling as it diminished the 
potency of the injunctions themselves. Brown II thus equilibrated against Brown I by effectively scal-
ing downwards the value of the remedy that claimants could seek and obtain. 
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an “entitlement-strengthening” judge succeeds at scaling a remedy upwards, 
the “entitlement-weakening” judge might still counteract that change by ad-
justing some other component’s pass rate (and thus the entitlement’s overall 
availability) all the way down to 0%. (Once an entitlement becomes wholly 
unavailable to claimants, its positive expected value to the claimant and nega-
tive expected value to the government will always be equal to $0.00.) And fi-
nally, there may at some point emerge practical constraints on the extent of 
upward scaling. Civil fines and damage awards can only go up so far; beyond 
that, losing parties will not be able to pay them. Similarly, injunctive remedies 
can only be rendered so intrusive and wide-ranging; beyond that, the costs of 
enforcement will overwhelm the overseeing court. Some remedies may be 
scalable but few if any remedies are infinitely so. And once the remedy’s value 
reaches its practical upper bound, further compensating adjustments may be-
come impossible for the “entitlement-strengthening” judge to pursue. 
B. Exploiting Definitional Linkages 
A second means of overcoming the asymmetry would involve the creation 
and manipulation of linkages and dependencies across an entitlement’s constit-
uent components. We have thus far spoken as if doctrinal adjustments to one 
component will leave all other components of the entitlement unaffected: ex-
panding the remedy attached to a right will not make it any easier for the 
claimant to demonstrate a violation of the right, lessening the standing re-
quirements associated with a particular remedy will not make it easier for the 
claimant to show that the remedy ought to issue, expanding the substantive 
scope of a right will not make it easier for the claimant to allege an Article III 
injury-in-fact, and so forth. But this assumption may not always be true. The 
component requirements of a legal entitlement might sometimes interrelate in 
such a way that renders the claimant- or government-friendliness of one such 
requirement at least partially dependent on that of another. And where that is 
so, “entitlement-strengthening” judges should find themselves at somewhat 
less of a competitive disadvantage. 
Imagine, for instance, a tug of war between “entitlement-weakening” and 
“entitlement-strengthening” judges concerning the availability of the damages 
remedy to victims of unconstitutional acts of police brutality.136 Suppose that, 
in an effort to diminish plaintiffs’ ability to obtain this entitlement, the “enti-
tlement-weakening” judge manages to adjust the qualified immunity standard 
in a government-friendly direction, adopting a significantly more restrictive 
definition of what it means for a rule to be “clearly established.” (Qualified 
                                                                                                                           
 136 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 
(1985). 
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immunity doctrine, recall, permits monetary recovery against only those ex-
ecutive officials who violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”137) And suppose fur-
ther that the “entitlement-strengthening” judge, displeased with this adjustment 
to the entitlement’s remedial component, decides to equilibrate against it by 
rendering its substantive component (i.e., Fourth Amendment prohibitions on 
excessive force) more claimant-friendly than had previously been the case. 
By now we know the drill: all else equal, the initial, government-friendly 
adjustment to qualified immunity doctrine will be difficult (if not impossible) 
to neutralize via a subsequent, claimant-friendly adjustment to excessive force 
doctrine. But let us now relax the assumption that the substantive and remedial 
components are doctrinally independent. Doing so makes sense here. After all, 
in changing the substantive standards governing what counts as excessive 
force, a court alters not just the likelihood with which a subsequent plaintiff 
can show that a use of force was unlawful, but also the likelihood with which 
that plaintiff can show that the unlawfulness was clear.138 The clearly estab-
lished law requirement, in other words, incorporates by reference the substan-
tive standards of the excessive force rule; the more precise and exacting those 
standards become, the harder it is for a defendant to avoid liability for a de-
monstrably unlawful act. And that means that some claimant-friendly adjust-
ments to the substantive law should automatically effectuate parallel, claimant-
friendly adjustments to the remedial law as well. 
In other words, the definitional linkages that exist across qualified im-
munity doctrine and Fourth Amendment excessive force doctrine enable the 
“entitlement-strengthening” judge to secure two doctrinal adjustments for the 
price of one.139 In this context, altering the scope of the substantive law neces-
                                                                                                                           
 137 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 138 Indeed, that seems doubly true in this particular context, given that both the substantive rule 
and the remedial rule turn on considerations of reasonableness. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s 
Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 861 (2010) (“Given that the underlying right 
incorporates all these potentially exculpatory considerations, the role of qualified immunity in exces-
sive force cases is not at all obvious.”). But see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 204 (2001) (insisting 
that “[t]he inquiries for qualified immunity and excessive force remain distinct”). 
 139 Constitutional tort litigation is by no means the only context in which definitional linkages of 
this sort might arise. For another example, consider the oft-cited relationship between the political 
question doctrine and judgments on the merits. In particular, the question of whether a constitutional 
challenge involves a “textually demonstrable commitment” of an issue to another branch of govern-
ment will often necessarily implicate the question of whether that branch has in fact exceeded consti-
tutional limits on its authority. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969) 
(“[A]nalysis of the ‘textual commitment’ under Art. I, § 5 . . . has demonstrated that in judging the 
qualifications of its members Congress is limited to the standing qualifications prescribed in the Con-
stitution. . . . Therefore, we hold that, since Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was duly elected by the voters 
of the 18th Congressional District of New York and was not ineligible to serve under any provision of 
the Constitution, the House was without power to exclude him from its membership.”). 
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sarily means altering the stringency of its accompanying remedial rules. The 
“entitlement-strengthening” judge does not need to make any formal changes 
to qualified immunity doctrine for it to operate as a less formidable barrier to 
relief. Because the applicability of the qualified immunity rule depends on the 
applicability of the excessive-force rule, a single, claimant-friendly adjustment 
to excessive-force doctrine should yield additionally claimant-friendly benefits 
within the remedial law as well. 
To be sure, definitional linkages of this sort can be exploited in either di-
rection. Just as our “entitlement-strengthening” judge might manage to expand 
both the right and remedy with a single, claimant-friendly change to substan-
tive law, so too might an “entitlement-weakening” judge manage to secure 
simultaneous movements in the opposite direction. But even if definitional 
linkages are equally susceptible to “entitlement-weakening” and “entitlement-
strengthening” change, “entitlement-strengthening” judges should tend to ben-
efit more as the number of linked and interdependent component requirements 
increases. 
That point should be apparent when one recalls that the magnitude of the 
entrenchment asymmetry depends on the total number of component require-
ments that determine the entitlement’s availability.140 If an entitlement’s avail-
ability is dictated by only one component requirement—i.e., a “holistic” amal-
gam of procedural, substantive, and remedial rules—then the asymmetry will 
vanish altogether. If the entitlement consists of three components, then the 
asymmetry should start to emerge. And the gulf will widen still as the entitle-
ment becomes more disaggregated and compartmentalized. Thus, all else 
equal, an “entitlement-weakening” judge would prefer for an entitlement’s 
availability to depend on as many component requirements as possible. 
And when components become definitionally interdependent—when the 
applicability of one component requirement depends on both its “own” doctri-
nal rules and also the doctrinal rules of another component requirement—it 
becomes less plausible to characterize those components as genuinely separate 
and distinct from one another.141 Rather, two definitionally linked sets of doc-
trinal rules will start to behave as if they had fused to form a single component 
requirement governed by a unitary body of law. Thus, by creating and 
                                                                                                                           
 140 For further discussion of this point, see supra Section II.A. 
 141 A related example concerns the “irreparable harm” and “inadequate remedy at law” require-
ments of the four-factor test for permanent injunctions. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 
U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Several commentators have noted that the two tests are so closely interrelated as 
to essentially operate as “one and the same” legal requirement. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Redundan-
cy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 639 (2016). And as courts “tend overwhelmingly 
to generate identical outcomes through their analysis of the separate prongs[,]” the eBay four-factor 
test can really be understood as involving three factors instead. Id. 
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strengthening definitional linkages between an entitlement’s component re-
quirements, courts can effectively reduce the number of component require-
ments on which an entitlement’s availability depends. For instance, the “dam-
ages-for-excessive-force” entitlement can be described as including one sub-
stantive excessive force component and another remedial qualified immunity 
component. But if the two components consistently move together, it may be 
more accurate to characterize the entitlement as including a single, “excessive-
force-qualified-immunity” component governed by a hybridized body of right-
remedy law. The greater the number of interdependent components within an 
entitlement, the lesser the number of independent components. And the lesser 
the number of independent components, the lesser the extent of the “entitle-
ment-weakening” judge’s advantage. 
C. Propping Up Substitute Entitlements 
The entrenchment asymmetry applies to the availability of individual le-
gal entitlements. But the world is populated by many such entitlements, and 
the asymmetry itself tells us nothing about how these entitlements might de-
velop and behave as an overall, collective whole. There are lots of rights out 
there and lots of remedies with which to enforce them. Even if each individual 
entitlement is itself more vulnerable to contractionary rather than expansionary 
change, the sum total of such entitlements might continue to afford claimants a 
variety of different avenues of constitutional redress. 
That observation points the way to another potential means by which 
claimant-friendly judges might sometimes manage to overcome the entrench-
ment asymmetry itself. Even where the asymmetry renders one particular enti-
tlement especially susceptible to erosion, “entitlement-strengthening” judges 
might nonetheless manage to rely on other “substitute” entitlements as an alter-
native means of vindicating the vulnerable entitlement’s underlying values and 
priorities. If multiple, nominally separate legal entitlements provide equally via-
ble means of effectuating the same underlying interests, then proponents of those 
interests need only ensure that one of the substitutes remains available. In this 
way, substitute entitlements might enable “entitlement-strengthening” judges to 
flip the script on the entrenchment asymmetry, giving the proponents of an en-
titlement multiple alternative means of promoting a set of legal objectives, 
while imposing on the opponents of that entitlement the more daunting task of 
having to undermine every one of the substitutes. 
1. Substitute Remedies 
One immediately evident means of propping up substitute entitlements 
involves the use of multiple remedies as alternate means of enforcing the same 
underlying right. The entrenchment asymmetry will often render “entitlement-
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strengthening” judges powerless to respond to an “entitlement-weakening” 
decision within the particular remedial context in which that decision arises. If 
an earlier decision makes it difficult for claimants to obtain damages against 
government officials who unlawfully search their homes, an “entitlement-
strengthening” judge might be unable to equilibrate against that decision by, 
say, eliminating a procedural prerequisite to the bringing of such an action in 
the first place. But if other remedies furnish an equally viable means of vindi-
cating the same right, an “entitlement-strengthening” judge might still be able 
to prop up a substitute entitlement instead. Restrictions on, say, “monetary re-
lief for the victims of unlawful searches” could be met with a strengthening of 
the exclusionary rule for unlawful-search claims in criminal cases, just as re-
strictions on, say, post-conviction relief for claimants asserting ineffective as-
sistance claims could be met with the recognition of a special cause of action 
for a damages remedy instead. Where doctrinally distinctive remedies offer at 
least roughly interchangeable avenues for enforcing the right in question, the 
proponent of the right need only ensure that one such remedy remains widely 
available to the right’s intended beneficiaries. Opponents of the right, by con-
trast, must close off all possible paths to relief.142 
But relying on substitute remedies in this way will not always yield a suc-
cessful strategy for overcoming the asymmetric entrenchment of entitlements. 
For one thing, certain types of substantive claims tend to accompany specific 
types of remedial requests. Fourth Amendment-based excessive force claims, 
for instance, almost always accompany after-the-fact requests for monetary 
damages;143 Miranda claims are almost always raised as a defense to a crimi-
nal prosecution;144 Sixth Amendment-based ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims almost always accompany post-conviction habeas corpus petitions;145 
                                                                                                                           
 142 A good example might involve the “legal fiction” of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), 
which, by allowing suit against individual officers, created viable substitutes for various entitlements 
that previously depended on suits against the State (and that the Court had previously weakened with 
its decision in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)). See Henry Paul Monaghan, Commentary, The 
Sovereign Immunity “Exception,” 110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 126–32 (1996) (discussing the continuing 
effects of the Young decision).  
 143 Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pictures and Renegade Officials: The Slow Death of Monroe v. Pape, 78 
UMKC L. REV. 889, 920 (2010) (“Fourth Amendment claims challenging police officers’ use of ex-
cessive force cannot be remedied by exclusion because such conduct is unlikely to yield evidence. 
Without § 1983 damages, there is no other vehicle for constitutional enforcement.”). 
 144 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 
405, 471 (2012) (“[V]ery few claims of Miranda violations are in fact litigated in the context of mon-
ey damages actions under § 1983 when compared with the scores of Miranda decisions raised in crim-
inal proceedings.”). 
 145 Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assis-
tance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 689 (2007) (“Although defendants can theoretical-
ly raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal, the vast majority of jurisdictions 
do not allow defendants to open or supplement the trial court record to support these claims.”); see 
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and so forth.146 For these “single-remedy” rights, propping up remedies that 
are infrequently (if ever) used to enforce the rights will do little to mitigate 
“entitlement-weakening” encroachments on the primary remedy itself. 
In addition, even for genuinely “multiple-remedy” rights, the opening up 
of one remedial avenue in response to the closing of another may not always 
prove to offer a genuine substitute for the eliminated entitlement. Multiple, 
different remedies may all help to promote the interests associated with a par-
ticular substantive right, but each individual remedy does so in materially dif-
ferent ways. Suppose, for instance, that an initial decision reduces the extent to 
which claimants can secure compensation for past abridgements of their free-
exercise rights. Expanding the availability of prospective relief for free-
exercise violations might help to offset the effects of the earlier weakening of 
the damages remedy in free-exercise cases. But the substitute entitlement will 
not do anything to further the compensatory or restitutionary interests of claim-
ants who, having already suffered an abridgement of their free-exercise rights, 
seek after-the-fact redress from the courts.147 Suppose similarly that an equili-
brating court makes monetary relief more widely available to victims of unlaw-
ful searches, so as to counteract the effects of an earlier contraction of the exclu-
sionary rule. The compensating adjustment may help to restore the deterrent 
force of Fourth Amendment-based privacy protections, but it will not do any-
thing to alleviate the injustice and unfairness felt by those who suffer convictions 
based on unlawfully acquired evidence. “Entitlement-strengthening” adjust-
ments within other remedial contexts may help to offset the effects of a par-
ticular entitlement’s demise. But if each unique entitlement furthers its own 
unique set of interests, the offsetting effect will inevitably remain partial and 
incomplete.148 
                                                                                                                           
also Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320–22 (1981) (holding that a public defender does not act 
“under color of state law” for purposes of establishing civil liability under § 1983). 
 146 See Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, Enforcing Rights, 62 UCLA L. REV. 306, 308 (2015) (“[I]n 
constitutional litigation, the availability of multiple remedial avenues is the subject of resistance, not 
acceptance.”). 
 147 See Chen, supra note 143, at 916 (“[W]hen the Court precludes or imposes burdens on § 1983 
damages claims, it offers no meaningful federal alternative for relief.”). 
 148 Professor Leah Litman has highlighted one respect in which the existence of multiple remedial 
avenues might end up undercutting, rather than promoting, the overall enforcement of a given consti-
tutional right. Specifically, such an arrangement might give rise to “a kind of shell game, where the 
Court looks at each remedial context separately, and denies one remedy based in part on an unjustified 
presumption that another remedy will be available to vindicate the underlying right in a different con-
text.” Leah Litman, Remedial Convergence and Collapse, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1477, 1528 (2018). 
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2. Substitute Rights 
Rather than focus on remedies, a second version of the substitution strate-
gy might look for substitutes within the substantive law itself. Specifically, 
where an initial decision weakens a legal entitlement by contracting the scope 
of its underlying substantive right, a supporter of that entitlement might re-
spond to the decision by propping up some other legal right that safeguards the 
same underlying interests and values. If, for instance, an initial decision has the 
effect of weakening free-exercise protections for victims of religious discrimi-
nation, an “entitlement-strengthening” court might respond by bolstering 
equal-protection-based limits on similarly discriminatory acts.149 Similarly, if 
an initial decision has the effect of weakening Fourth Amendment-based re-
strictions on police brutality, an “entitlement-strengthening” court might at-
tempt to bolster substantive due process prohibitions on similar conduct in-
stead.150 And similar efforts might span the boundaries of constitutional and 
non-constitutional law: claimant-friendly judges might compensate for “enti-
tlement-weakening” diminutions of the Confrontation Clause right by pursuing 
“entitlement-strengthening” expansions of evidentiary hearsay protections;151 
they might compensate for “entitlement-weakening” diminutions of Fourth 
Amendment restrictions on electronic surveillance by pursuing “entitlement-
strengthening” expansions of statutory prohibitions on wiretapping;152 they 
might compensate for “entitlement-weakening” diminutions of free-exercise 
rights by pursuing “entitlement-strengthening” expansions of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act;153 and so forth.154 In short, where doctrinal redun-
dancies arise within the substantive law,155 those redundancies might lay the 
groundwork for the development and deployment of substitute entitlements.156 
                                                                                                                           
 149 See Hessick, supra note 105, at 648 (“The two clauses each prohibit government discrimina-
tion against individuals based on religion, and they each have their own doctrines to enforce that limi-
tation.”). 
 150 Cf. Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due 
Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 565 (2008) (“Arrestees and pretrial detainees whose claims do not fall 
under the Fourth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment may pursue relief under substantive due 
process.”). 
 151 See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) (“[H]earsay rules and the Confronta-
tion Clause are generally designed to protect similar values . . . .”). 
 152 Kerr, supra note 107, at 850–51. 
 153 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728–32 (2014). 
 154 See Coenen, supra note 111, at 724–25 (highlighting additional examples of nonconstitutional 
norms that help to further values and interests associated with constitutional provisions). 
 155 See generally Hessick, supra note 105, at 648 (highlighting instances in which “two separate 
doctrines protect the same values”). 
 156 See id. at 654 (“[R]edundancy increases protections across cases by reducing the consequences 
of an appellate decision that limits or abolishes a doctrine.”); cf. Golden, supra note 141, at 709 (not-
ing that a redundant doctrine can sometimes operate as a “backstop or safety valve” for other rules). 
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This strategy too, however, may ultimately yield benefits that are more 
theoretical than real. To begin with, not all substantive rights exist alongside 
fully redundant counterparts: many such rights lack obvious substitutes, and 
even where such substitutes do arguably exist, the overlap is often partial and 
incomplete.157 In addition, overlapping substantive rules will not afford much 
value to “entitlement-strengthening” judges when, as is often the case, they 
end up operating as linked and codependent requirements.158 It may be true, 
for instance, that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the 
First Amendment’s Religion Clauses create similar safeguards against religious 
discrimination, but courts often do not treat these clauses as independent and 
self-contained fonts of rights-based protection. Rather, courts simply effectuate 
and enforce a single doctrinal “rule” against religious discrimination that the 
relevant clauses are said to support.159 It may also be true that Fourth and 
Eighth Amendment-based protections against physically abusive treatment of 
arrestees and/or incarcerated persons find a potential substitute in “substantive 
due process”-based protections of bodily autonomy. But that is not of much 
significance given courts’ frequent refusal to entertain substantive due process 
claims in cases otherwise covered by the more specific guarantees.160 Where 
substitute rights are linked together in this way, they lose much of their utility 
as a means of counteracting “entitlement-weakening” change. Under these cir-
cumstances, propping up the substitute entitlement becomes functionally indis-
tinguishable from propping up the original entitlement, a task fully subject to 
doctrinal equilibration and the asymmetry to which it gives rise. 
                                                                                                                           
 157 To take one simple example, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause apply against both the 
state and federal governments, whereas the Religious Freedom Restoration Act applies only against 
the federal government. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534–35 (1997). 
 158 See Hessick, supra note 105, at 653 (noting that “there is always some risk that courts will 
treat redundant doctrines as codependent”). A related phenomenon involves the court deriving rules 
and decisions from “the joint decisional force of two or more constitutional provisions.” See Michael 
Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2016). 
 159 See, e.g., Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1257–58 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting 
that, although the claimant had raised “claims under three different constitutional clauses governing 
religious discrimination, all of them draw on . . . common principles,” and going on to analyze the 
claims under the same general test). 
 160 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (holding that “all claims that law enforcement officers have used 
excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a 
free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather 
than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach”); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 
(1997) (noting that “Graham simply requires that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific 
constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under 
the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process”); 
see also Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998) (“[W]here a particular Amendment provides 
an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, 
that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for 
analyzing these claims.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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3. Defensive Enforcement 
A final substitution strategy might involve the enforcement of rights as 
shields rather than swords.161 Most of the entitlements we have thus far dis-
cussed involve the offensive invocation of rights in civil cases, with plaintiffs 
and petitioners pointing to a legal right as a reason why courts ought to do 
something (e.g., award damages, enjoin unlawful conduct, issue declaratory 
judgments, grant a habeas petition, etc.) on their behalf. But rights can also be 
invoked defensively in criminal cases and other government enforcement ac-
tions, with defendants pointing to a right as a reason why courts should not 
allow the government to go forward with an action that the government is try-
ing to undertake. 
Defensively enforceable legal entitlements—entitlements such as, say, the 
“power of a criminal defendant to avoid prosecution for criticizing the gov-
ernment”—may prove a useful means of resisting the entrenchment asymmetry 
because such entitlements do not often carry as many prerequisites to their en-
forcement. Criminal and civil defendants, for instance, need not do anything 
special in order to satisfy Article III standing requirements,162 they need not 
demonstrate an explicit or implicit cause of action that authorizes the assertion 
of their defense,163 and they need not clear many (if any) remedial hurdles on 
the way to persuading courts to issue the “sanction of nullification.”164 To be 
sure, some procedural and remedial prerequisites may still come into play. 
Rights-based defenses must be raised in accordance with the applicable rules 
of criminal or civil procedure;165 third-party standing requirements may limit 
defendants’ ability to invoke the rights and interests of parties not before the 
courts;166 evidentiary rules may limit discovery on factual questions necessary 
to prove an affirmative defense;167 waiver and forfeiture rules will sometimes 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1532, 1532–33 (1972). 
 162 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 217 (2011) (noting that, in criminal cases, a 
defendant’s “challenge to her conviction and sentence ‘satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement, 
[given that] the incarceration constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable 
by invalidation of the conviction’” (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 
1 (1998))). 
 163 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(1) (“A party may raise by pretrial motion any defense, objec-
tion, or request that the court can determine without a trial on the merits.”). 
 164 Dellinger, supra note 161, at 1532. 
 165 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12. 
 166 See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) (“Embedded in the traditional 
rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a statute may consti-
tutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably 
be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court.”). 
 167 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461–71 (1996) (limiting criminal defend-
ants’ power to obtain discovery on selective prosecution claims). 
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prevent defendants from raising certain types of defenses;168 and the harmless 
error rule will limit an appellate court’s power to consider allegations of pro-
cedural error at a criminal trial.169 Even so, the uniquely defensive posture of 
the claimant’s position might sometimes tend to reduce the number of compo-
nent requirements bound up in the relevant legal entitlement and thus, along 
with it, the entitlement’s vulnerability to contractionary legal change. 
Once again, however, there arises the question of how adequately a de-
fensive version of an entitlement can operate as a substitute for its offensively 
enforceable counterpart. For one thing, many substantive rights may be practi-
cally impossible to assert in a defensive posture. The government can often 
violate legal rights without bringing a full-scale criminal prosecution—as 
might happen, for instance, when a speaker is yanked off the platform (but 
thereupon never arrested), when the unlawful search of a home yields no in-
criminating evidence, or when persons already incarcerated are subject to abu-
sive treatment. These and other actions will create material legal harms separate 
and apart from any judicial proceeding that the right might be used to block, and 
they therefore will be largely immune to defensive remediation.170 In addition, 
other such rights—though theoretically available as a shield against coercive 
governmental action—may prove elusive to enforcement and development given 
the would-be claimants’ unwillingness to risk subjecting themselves to punish-
ments and sanctions that would follow from a successful government enforce-
ment action.171 In short, although “entitlement-strengthening” judges might 
sometimes be able to turn to shield-like legal entitlements to counteract “enti-
tlement-weakening” changes to their sword-like counterparts, the shield-like 
substitute will not always succeed at vindicating the underlying interests in a 
manner that compensates for the original entitlement’s demise. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
To recap briefly where we have been: Part I of this Article advanced the 
claim that the basic architecture of public-law doctrine often gives rise to an 
asymmetry between the proponents and opponents of legal entitlements, af-
fording the latter a greater degree of power to equilibrate against unwanted 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See Coenen, supra note 111, at 703–07. 
 169 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
 170 See Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: 
Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 326 (1988) 
(“[D]efensive remedies are inefficacious in dealing with practices that do not lead to criminal prosecu-
tions.”). 
 171 Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 490 (2015) (“We 
normally do not require plaintiffs to bet the farm by taking the violative action before testing the va-
lidity of the law . . . .” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). 
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changes to the entitlement’s overall availability.172 Parts II and III then expand-
ed on (and to some extent qualified) this basic idea, with Part II highlighting 
additional doctrinal variables bearing on the overall magnitude of the en-
trenchment asymmetry,173 and Part III identifying several ways in which “enti-
tlement-strengthening” judges might attempt to overcome the asymmetry 
through indirect means.174 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the entrenchment asymmetry, though 
by no means an omnipresent feature of public-law doctrine and by no means 
the exclusive determinant of legal change over time, at least sometimes oper-
ates as a special impediment to the creation and preservation of robust legal 
entitlements. And that observation raises the final important question with 
which this Article engages: why should we care? The entrenchment asymmetry 
may well exist, and deducing its existence may involve some interesting theo-
retical imaginings, but if nothing of significance turns on its existence, it is 
hard to justify the effort. 
As it turns out, I believe that thinking carefully about the entrenchment 
asymmetry can yield three different sorts of practically useful implications. 
First, at a descriptive level, recognizing the asymmetry may help to enrich our 
understanding of past doctrinal developments and to inform our predictions 
about future such developments.175 Second, at a strategic level, recognizing the 
asymmetry might usefully inform decisions on the part of both judges and liti-
gants about how best to allocate finite resources on behalf of their respective 
ideological goals.176 And finally, at a normative level, recognizing the asym-
metry might point the way to a more refined and nuanced assessment of the 
tradeoffs associated with the judicial project of articulating and enforcing pub-
lic-law entitlements.177 
A. Descriptive Implications 
At the most basic level, recognizing and understanding the entrenchment 
asymmetry might influence our perceptions of past doctrinal developments and 
our predictions about future ones. Consider the example of the Warren Court. 
Prior to the Warren Court’s existence, as David Rudovsky has noted, the “[civil 
rights] landscape was quite barren.”178 There were “few of the landmark deci-
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sions establishing the constitutional rights that we today take for granted,” 
there was “no damages remedy for many constitutional violations,” and (not 
unrelatedly) there were “few advocacy or litigation-oriented organizations that 
promoted civil liberties or litigated these issues in the courts.”179 Two decades 
later, that landscape looked radically different. Decisions like Brown I,180 Gid-
eon v. Wainwright,181 Reynolds v. Sims,182 Brandenburg v. Ohio,183 and Engel v. 
Vitale184 had produced an expanded array of constitutional rights for claimants 
to assert against government actors. Decisions such as Monroe v. Pape,185 
Mapp v. Ohio,186 and Brown v. Allen187 produced an expanded set of remedial 
tools with which these rights could be enforced.188 And decisions such as 
Baker v. Carr189 and Flast v. Cohen190 helped to dismantle previously imposing 
justiciability-based barriers to the invocation of claimants’ rights in Article III 
courts. These and other reforms transformed the world of public-law litigation, 
rendering the federal judiciary a powerful defender of a number of newly rec-
ognized individual rights. 
What new light, if any, does this Article shed on this familiar historical 
narrative? First, the entrenchment asymmetry’s existence helps to underscore 
the overall ambitiousness of the Warren Court’s agenda. That the Warren Court 
pursued so many different doctrinal innovations across so many different areas 
of the law is in and of itself a remarkable fact. But that fact is made all the 
more remarkable when one recognizes that the majority of those innovations 
proceeded against the grain of the asymmetry itself. What the Warren Court 
sought to accomplish was a large-scale, multi-front expansion of access to le-
gal entitlements, and the bulk of its work thus involved the added levels of 
time, energy, and creativity that “entitlement-strengthening” efforts tend to 
require. 
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More important, the asymmetry might also inform our understanding of 
what ended up happening next.191 Specifically, the asymmetry should render us 
not especially surprised by the successes that subsequent iterations of the Court 
realized in dismantling many of the Warren Court’s “entitlement-strengthening” 
initiatives.192 Expansions of criminal procedure rights found themselves under-
cut by contractions of the exclusionary rule;193 Monroe v. Pape found itself 
undercut by the development of absolute and qualified immunity doctrines;194 
Brown v. Allen found itself undercut by a host of newly recognized restrictions 
on post-conviction relief;195 and so forth.196 Having developed a host of new 
legal entitlements for claimants to pursue, the Warren Court simultaneously 
created numerous new places at which subsequent courts could and would 
manage to equilibrate back in the direction of “entitlement-weakening” 
change.197 This was by no means a foreordained outcome, but the entrench-
ment asymmetry helped to stack the deck in its favor. 
Turning our gaze to the future, we might also think about the entrench-
ment asymmetry when making predictions about the long-term successes and 
failures of the Court’s now-solidly conservative majority. The constitutional 
agenda of this new majority is likely to include both “entitlement-weakening” 
and “entitlement-strengthening” objectives. Among the legal entitlements like-
ly to be targeted for further weakening (and in some cases already substantially 
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weakened) are those involving the right to an abortion, rights for LGBT indi-
viduals, and rights against partisan gerrymandering.198 Among the entitlements 
likely to be targeted for further promotion are those involving rights against 
race-conscious admissions programs, the right to bear arms, and free speech-
based rights against various forms of economic and commercial regulation.199 
Even if these changes are all readily realizable over the short term,200 the 
asymmetry gives us some reason to think that the “entitlement-weakening” 
planks of the new Court’s agenda are more likely to endure over the long haul. 
If and when the Court swings back in the other ideological direction, its new 
members should find themselves relatively well equipped to equilibrate against 
the new entitlements that their predecessors have created. But those same Jus-
tices may well encounter more difficulty when attempting to revive and revi-
talize the entitlements its predecessors had sapped of strength. Reestablishing, 
say, the right to an abortion in the wake of an overruled Roe v. Wade would 
require, at a minimum, the “un-overruling” of Roe itself.201 Establishing a jus-
ticiable constitutional norm against partisan gerrymandering would require, at 
a minimum, an overruling of Rucho v. Common Cause, the articulation of a 
substantive standard to govern such claims, and the deployment of remedial 
mechanisms designed to help enforce it.202 And all such efforts may well re-
quire even more than that, depending on how aggressively the Roberts Court 
manages to fortify its “entitlement-weakening” efforts against anticipated 
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countermeasures by future Justices. This is all just speculation, hazarded in the 
face of considerable uncertainty about what the future might hold. But if we 
are forced to render a prediction in the face of that uncertainty, the entrench-
ment asymmetry provides some reason to suspect that the Roberts Court’s 
long-term legacy is more likely to be reflected in the old entitlements it man-
ages to destroy rather than the new entitlements it manages to create. 
B. Strategic Implications 
The strategic implications follow directly from the predictive ones. If “en-
titlement-strengthening” changes are less likely than “entitlement-weakening” 
changes to persist through time, then that fact might usefully inform strategic 
decisions about the sorts of legal initiatives that litigants and lawyers should 
choose to prioritize over others. If, say, a public interest organization is equally 
worried about the potential dismantling of an entitlement it supports as it is 
about the potential bolstering of an entitlement it opposes, the entrenchment 
asymmetry might provide reason for that organization to dedicate more of its 
resources towards protecting the favored entitlement (and fewer of its re-
sources towards quashing the disfavored entitlement). From the organization’s 
perspective, the “entitlement-weakening” change poses a greater degree of 
long-term risk; that change, unlike its “entitlement-strengthening” counterpart, 
would prove more resistant to counteractive equilibration and would thus 
prove more likely to exert significant and unchanging influence over time. 
A related point applies to the Supreme Court. The Court polices lower 
court adherence to its decisions and sometimes grants certiorari to correct er-
roneous or misguided lower court applications of established precedent.203 
Paying heed to the entrenchment asymmetry, the Court might reasonably de-
cide to monitor with special attention lower court applications of its “entitle-
ment-strengthening” (as opposed to “entitlement-weakening”) precedents. The 
“entitlement-strengthening” precedents, after all, may not accomplish much if 
lower courts find ways to equilibrate around them, and the entrenchment 
asymmetry suggests that lower courts will often be able to do just that. 
Again, I do not mean to oversimplify what are undoubtedly complex and 
multi-faceted decisions. One can certainly imagine scenarios in which the par-
ticularities of a certain “entitlement-strengthening” change—such as, for in-
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stance, its immediate, adverse effects on a vulnerable population—render it a 
far more serious threat to those who oppose it than any number of other “enti-
tlement-weakening” changes that might be on the horizon. And it is equally 
possible to imagine other scenarios in which the particularities of a certain “en-
titlement-weakening” change—such as, for instance, the possibility that legis-
latures might act to counteract the change through the development of substi-
tute, non-constitutional rights—render it a less serious threat than any number 
of “entitlement-strengthening” changes instead. The entrenchment asymmetry 
represents just one factor among many to consider when thinking about how 
best to allocate finite resources on behalf of or against the various constitution-
al initiatives working their way through the courts. But although the asym-
metry itself will rarely demonstrate the obvious correctness of one decision 
over another, it might at least help to inform the overall strategic choice. 
C. Normative Implications 
Let us at long last consider an issue we have thus far avoided: is the en-
trenchment asymmetry a good or bad thing? The answer to this question de-
pends largely on our attitudes towards judicial restraint.204 Specifically, propo-
nents of judicial restraint—i.e., those who believe that courts should exercise 
special care before meddling in the affairs of governmental actors—may well 
regard the entrenchment asymmetry as a salutary check on unduly interven-
tionist forms of judicial action.205 Robust public-law entitlements empower 
courts, at the behest of individual claimants, to prevent, curtail, punish, or oth-
erwise act to constrain government actors’ efforts to achieve their own regula-
tory goals, and that is itself a power that courts could come to abuse. Thus, to 
the extent one harbors special worries about the over-enforcement of public-
law entitlements—worries that courts will, if not properly restrained, arrogate 
to themselves an inappropriately active role in supervising legislatures, agen-
cies, and other public officials—then one would have good reason to favor a 
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doctrinal phenomenon that helps to undermine the enforcement of robust, 
court-empowering packages of remedies and rights. 
That is the most straightforward normative case to be made on behalf of 
the entrenchment asymmetry. But there are at least two different ways of re-
sponding to it. The first is to contest the premise that judicial restraint is in fact 
such a uniformly good thing. One need not be a dyed-in-the-wool judicial ac-
tivist to recognize that the value of judicial intervention depends a great deal 
on the circumstances in which it is demanded. And even if one generally fa-
vors judicial restraint as a worthy baseline posture for courts to assume, one 
might still recognize instances in which the risks of judicial passivity far out-
weigh the risks of judicial aggressiveness. And where that is so, the entrench-
ment asymmetry might impose undesirable costs on the sustained development 
and enforcement of normatively worthwhile restrictions on government action. 
That is not itself a refutation of the suggestion that the proponents of judicial 
restraint should tend to favor the asymmetric entrenchment of legal entitle-
ments; but it at least helps to introduce some nuance into the overall normative 
equation. 
The second and somewhat less obvious response to the restraint-based de-
fense would attempt to flip the argument on its head. The restraint-based de-
fense sees the value of judicial restraint as a reason to favor the asymmetric 
entrenchment of legal entitlements. But one might alternatively see the en-
trenchment asymmetry as a reason to attach less value to judicial restraint. If 
decisions that strengthen legal entitlements are more naturally prone to equili-
bration-based undoing, that fact might actually justify some amount of crea-
tivity and flexibility when it comes to establishing legal entitlements in the 
first place. The future possibility of equilibration, after all, somewhat lessens 
the practical stakes of recognizing a new legal entitlement; yes, the entitlement 
might veer too far in the activist direction, constraining useful forms of gov-
ernmental conduct, running too far afoul of majoritarian preferences, and so 
forth. But if those consequences come about, then there will often remain addi-
tional means by which subsequent courts can rein in the entitlement’s adverse 
effects. By contrast, a judicial decision not to vindicate public-law rights is less 
malleable going forward. If such a decision turns out to involve a problematic 
under-enforcement of valuable legal interests, future courts will be compara-
tively less able to mitigate those adverse effects. Again, that observation in and 
of itself hardly resolves the question of whether some court should or should 
not attempt to recognize a new legal entitlement in some future case. But it 
does at least highlight another dimension along which to evaluate the restraint-
related tradeoffs that any such decision will pose. 
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CONCLUSION 
Generally speaking, it is harder to build things up than to tear things 
down.206 Stadiums are harder to construct than to implode; origami is harder to 
fold than to shred; glass is harder to manufacture than to shatter; and gardens 
are harder to grow than to trample upon. My three-year-old daughter has no 
idea how to tie my shoes, but she can (and does) revel in untying them. My 
dog has no idea how to bake a cake, but he does know how to eat one. I could 
never program smartphones, but I am distressingly adroit at rendering them 
inoperable. Making useful things is a far more complicated task than rendering 
things useless, and we could identify countless other objects whose creation 
requires far more time, effort, and coordination than does their destruction. 
In a way, that simple feature of everyday life captures the core intuition 
underlying the hypothesis I have here attempted to advance.207 Legal entitle-
ments are human-made “things,” owing their existence to coordinated judicial 
efforts across multiple, different areas of the law. The recognition, enforce-
ment, and vindication of these entitlements require sustained judicial interven-
tion over time, whereas the non-recognition and/or non-vindication of these 
entitlements can be accomplished with less proactivity. Left to their own de-
vices, previously recognized entitlements will start to wither on the vine; pre-
viously recognized “non-entitlements,” by contrast, will happily persist in their 
extant, non-functional forms. And as the design of these entitlements becomes 
more intricate and complex, with different aspects of their operation governed 
by specialized and compartmentalized bodies of procedural, substantive, and 
remedial law, this asymmetry should assume even starker relief. Legal entitle-
ments are in this sense no different from the myriad other creations that hu-
mans bring into existence: cultivating them is hard; ruining them is easy. 
To be sure, this Article’s thesis, like this basic life lesson, is subject to its 
own qualifications, limitations, and nuances. The entrenchment asymmetry 
may not always exist, its magnitude is context dependent, and it will often find 
itself overcome by other, more powerful forces that move in the “entitlement-
strengthening” direction. But while we should resist the urge to oversimplify, 
we should also not lose the forest for the trees. In general, “entitlement-
strengthening” initiatives will be more vulnerable to down-the-road resistance 
than will their “entitlement-weakening” counterparts, just as so many other 
products of human creation will be harder to create and maintain than they are 
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to target and destroy. As the universe tends towards entropy,208 so too should 
the world of the law. 
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